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DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND  
RURAL AMERICA 
ANN M. EISENBERG* 
Abstract: Today’s discourse on struggling rural communities insists they are 
“dying” or “forgotten.” Many point to globalization and automation as the cul-
prits that made livelihoods in agriculture, natural resource extraction, and manu-
facturing obsolete, fueling social problems such as the opioid crisis. This narra-
tive fails to offer a path forward; the status quo is no one’s fault, and this “natu-
ral” rural death inspires mourning rather than resuscitation. This Article offers a 
more illuminating account of the rural story, told through the lens of distributive 
justice principles. The Article argues that rural communities have not just “died.” 
They were sacrificed. Specifically, distributive justice theories question the mo-
rality of public measures that disadvantage discrete groups in the name of aggre-
gate welfare. A critique of legal frameworks shaping rural livelihoods for the past 
several decades shows that policymakers consistently decided to trade rural wel-
fare for some perceived societal benefit, violating distributive justice norms. In 
agriculture, policies favoring consolidated agribusiness hollowed out once-
multidimensional farm communities. In the extractive sector, lackluster oversight 
enabled the environmental and economic devastation of fossil fuel communities. 
In manufacturing, trade adjustment programs’ inadequate mitigation of interna-
tional competition facilitated whole towns’ dismantlement. Decisionmakers 
pointed to “the greater good” as their rationale. But benefits for rural communi-
ties that would offset these burdens and render their sacrifice “just” prove elu-
sive. This alternate narrative reveals the rural story as not morally neutral, but 
one infused with value judgments that determined winners and losers, raising 
questions of what a fairer allocation of benefits and burdens should be.  
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INTRODUCTION 
What happened to rural America and what should be done about it? These 
questions have shaped the public and scholarly discourse on rural communities 
since the 2016 presidential election and its run-up. Many now realize that 
something is wrong outside large population centers in the United States—
something that has rendered certain communities in rural America “forgotten,” 
“left behind,” “dying,” “abandoned,” or at least, “resentful.”1 Yet there is little 
consensus about the optimal remedy for this nebulous wrong—for those who 
think action is warranted at all.2 
A fundamental problem with this discourse is its oversimplification of 
“rural America.” Commentators often focus, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
on the mystical land of “Trump country,” where everyone is white, angry, and 
a blind supporter of the president.3 This focus disserves rural communities in 
several ways. First, it erases substantial rural populations of color despite the 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER (2016) (detailing rural working-class resentment 
towards politicians who do not reflect their social values); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND: 
DECLINE AND RAGE IN RURAL AMERICA (2018) (discussing rural Americans’ anger and distrust to-
ward the federal government); Steven Conn, Is Rural America the New Inner City?, HUFFPOST (Mar. 
12, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rural-american-the-new-inner-city_us_58c5961ce4b
0a797c1d39e24 [https://perma.cc/9DQP-6ADC] (comparing rural America’s decline to that of Ameri-
ca’s inner cities and asserting that “America’s countryside is dying”); Juana Summers, The ‘Forgotten 
Tribe’ in West Virginia; Why America’s White Working Class Feels Left Behind, CNN POLITICS 
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/20/politics/election-2016-white-working-class-donald-
trump-kaiser-family-foundation/index.html [https://perma.cc/KJ29-FNS9] (describing disaffected 
West Virginians who feel “forgotten” and “left behind”). 
 2 See generally LOKA ASHWOOD, FOR-PROFIT DEMOCRACY: WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS LOSING 
THE TRUST OF RURAL AMERICA (2018) (blaming the democratic structure’s enmeshment with corpo-
rate profit for exploitation of rural populations); J.D. VANCE, HILLBILLY ELEGY: A MEMOIR OF A 
FAMILY AND CULTURE IN CRISIS (2016) (arguing that white, working-class Appalachians’ struggles 
stem from cultural problems that cannot easily be solved through policy); David Schleicher, Stuck! 
The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78 (2017) (discussing impediments 
to mobility as drivers of rural marginalization). 
 3 See Nathan A. Rosenberg & Bryce Wilson Stucki, The Butz Stops Here: Why the Food Move-
ment Needs to Rethink Agricultural History, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 12, 12 (2017). The authors note,  
After Donald Trump’s surprise victory over Hillary Clinton, commentators and journal-
ists turned their attention to rural America, where Trump won three times as many 
votes as his opponent, in order to understand what had just happened. They wrote about 
forgotten places: small towns populated by opioid addicts, dying Rust Belt cities with 
abandoned factories at their centers, and mountain hamlets populated by xenophobes 
and racists. These writers described a conservatism so total and inexplicable it seemed 
part of the landscape. Yet the history of rural America reveals a different story. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Larissa MacFarquhar, In the Heart of Trump Country, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/in-the-heart-of-trump-
country [https://perma.cc/PF9G-LA5J]. 
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fact that they bear the brunt of concentrated rural poverty. Second, the narra-
tive acknowledges rural socioeconomic decline while in the same breath im-
plying rural culpability for electing a highly polarizing president. This not only 
denies the existence of substantial populations of liberal or non-voting rural resi-
dents, but also provides an excuse for declining to address rural challenges.4 
The increased attention toward the rural may still seem beneficial for 
some distressed rural communities, stereotypes notwithstanding. When com-
mentators ask, “What happened?,” they mean, “What factors contributed to the 
widespread rural socioeconomic decline that has fueled feelings of despair and 
alienation among certain rural residents?”5 The most common response to this 
question focuses on rural economic marginalization stemming from globaliza-
tion and automation.6 Traditional livelihoods in agriculture, extractive indus-
tries, and manufacturing once sustained rural life throughout the country.7 
Globalization and automation undermined a substantial portion of these jobs 
over the past several decades, including steep declines in the twenty-first cen-
tury.8 This loss of a way of life has contributed to modern rural problems for-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Mark H. Harvey & Rosalind P. Harris, Racial Inequalities and Poverty in Rural America, in 
RURAL POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 141–42 (Ann R. Tickamyer et al. eds., 2017) (explain-
ing that rates of poverty among racial minorities living in rural America are two and sometimes three 
times higher than for rural whites); Mara Casey Tieken, There’s a Big Part of Rural America That 
Everyone’s Ignoring, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
theres-a-big-part-of-rural-america-that-everyones-ignoring/2017/03/24/d06d24d0-1010-11e7-ab07-
07d9f521f6b5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1ca147eae02f [https://perma.cc/EV34-HBEG] 
(detailing how the popular narrative on rural America often leaves out the 10.3 million people of a 
racial minority who live in rural America). These rural populations generally voted for Hillary Clinton 
in the 2016 presidential election. Tieken, supra. 
 5 See Ann M. Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 208–10 (2018). 
 6 See, e.g., Linda Lobao, Continuity and Change in Place Stratification: Spatial Inequality and 
Middle-Range Territorial Units, 69 RURAL SOC. 1, 21–25 (2004) (observing that rural areas are harder 
hit by global competition); Christopher D. Merrett & Cynthia Struthers, Globalization and the Future 
of Rural Communities in the American Midwest, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 63 
(2002); Robert E. Litan, Meeting the Automation Challenge to the Middle Class and the American 
Project, BROOKINGS (June 21, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/meeting-the-automation-
challenge-to-the-middle-class-and-the-american-project/ [https://perma.cc/9VX8-TJJE] (observing 
that automation’s cost savings tend not to benefit rural areas and smaller cities). 
 7 Thomas G. Johnson, The Rural Economy in a New Century, in BEYOND AGRICULTURE: NEW 
POLICIES FOR RURAL AMERICA 7, 7 (Cent. for the Study of Rural Am. ed., 2000), https://files.eric.
ed.gov/fulltext/ED455981.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA32-NDC2].  
 8 Daron Acemoglu et al., Import Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s, 34 
J. LAB. ECON. S141, S141–43 (2015); Michelle W. Anderson, The Western, Rural Rustbelt: Learning 
from Local Fiscal Crisis in Oregon, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 465, 512–13 (2014) (observing that 
globalization and automation had a greater displacement effect on rural manufacturing jobs than urban 
ones); Dirk Johnson, Population Decline in Rural America: A Product of Advances in Technology, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/11/us/population-decline-in-rural-
america-a-product-of-advances-in-technology.html [https://perma.cc/QL4B-DBPX]; Jennifer Ludden, 
Coal Jobs Have Gone up Under Trump, but Not Because of His Policies, NPR (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/23/586236738/coal-jobs-have-gone-up-under-trump-but-not-because-of-
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merly thought of as only “inner-city” problems: a drug crisis, high unemploy-
ment, mass population migration, steep drops in the tax base funding local 
governments, and a decaying socioeconomic and physical infrastructure.9 One 
might think that increased focus on these challenges would help to remedy 
them. 
Yet, this part of the narrative, too, is incomplete. Globalization and auto-
mation are framed almost as forces of nature. They are rarely portrayed as the 
consequence of deliberate policy choices; inaction in response to their fallout 
is similarly assumed to be somehow natural.10 The associated socioeconomic 
challenges, then, are no one’s fault. With no one responsible, there is no moral 
imperative for any entity to act. The “what should we do about it” question 
remains unanswered. Indeed, few meaningful policy options have emerged to 
address these troubling trends. Further, this issue’s momentousness does not 
readily suggest a course of remedial action. Rural poverty, the opioid crisis, 
and towns that are literally crumbling can seem like challenges almost too 
widespread and daunting to take on.11 Altogether, the dominant narrative sug-
gests that livelihoods, local governments, and infrastructure across rural Amer-
ica are dying a natural death, inspiring mourning rather than efforts at resusci-
tation.12 
In order to inform a more meaningful and productive dialogue, this Arti-
cle challenges the dominant narrative and offers an alternate account of the 
rural story.13 This alternate narrative centers on three main arguments. The first 
                                                                                                                           
his-policies [https://perma.cc/2HS3-BZU2] (discussing automation and competition for natural gas as 
the main drivers of loss of coal jobs); David Autor et al., When Work Disappears: Manufacturing 
Decline and the Falling Marriage-Market Value of Young Men (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 23173, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23173.pdf [https://perma.cc/32T5-
Q4HS]. 
 9 See Anderson, supra note 8, at 468 nn.12–13; Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 194–99; Alana 
Semuels, The Graying of Rural America, THE ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2016/06/the-graying-of-rural-america/485159/ [https://perma.cc/8GX6-Y79F]. 
 10 Cf. Eduardo Porter, The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/14/opinion/rural-america-trump-decline.html 
[https://perma.cc/C86P-CJXC] (characterizing phenomena affecting rural communities as “decline,” 
“growth,” and “agglomeration” rather than as consequences of policy decisions or lack thereof). 
 11 See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 188; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2017 
DRUG OVERDOSE DEATH RATES (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths/drug-
overdose-death-2017.html [https://perma.cc/22E8-KE3K] [hereinafter OVERDOSE DEATH RATES] 
(describing the disproportionately harsh effects of the opioid crisis on rural communities). 
 12 See Porter, supra note 10 (commenting that “nobody—not experts or policymakers or people in 
these communities—seems to know quite how to pick rural America up”).  
 13 Cf. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989). Delgado writes, 
Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful means for destroying mind-
set—the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings 
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is that today’s rural socioeconomic challenges and failures in public services 
did not simply result from the passive, benign evolution of economic forces. 
Instead, these challenges, whether new or longstanding, result at least in part 
from the law’s contribution to or failure to address different forms of distribu-
tive injustice, defined as the inequitable distribution of society’s burdens and 
benefits.14 
Some of that injustice is more self-evident, yet it remains absent from the 
“Trump country” discourse. Persistent inequitable allocations of resources to 
Native American reservations in South Dakota and rural schools in South Car-
olina, for instance, are clear examples of publicly driven racial discrimination 
and distributive injustice that intersect with rurality.15 It is, in fact, not difficult 
to establish that rural residents throughout the United States suffer from ineq-
uitable allocations of various critical resources. Some of these resource alloca-
tions, such as severe shortages of doctors and lawyers, public decisionmakers 
have overlooked, while others, such as inequitable education and infrastructure 
spending, they have created.16 At a minimum, these disparities suggest that 
                                                                                                                           
against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place. These matters 
are rarely focused on. They are like eyeglasses we have worn a long time. . . . Ideolo-
gy—the received wisdom—makes current social arrangements seem fair and natural. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 14 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (articulating a theory of how socie-
ties should pursue morally just distributions of resources). 
 15 Patrice H. Kunesh, A Call for an Assessment of the Welfare of Indian Children in South Dako-
ta, 52 S.D. L. REV. 247, 284–86 (2007); Kimberly Johnson, Verdict Looms for Education in ‘Corridor 
of Shame’: Race, Poverty and Geography Converge in the Longest Trial in South Carolina’s History, 
ALJAZEERA AM. (Aug. 11, 2014), http://projects.aljazeera.com/2014/south-carolina-schools/ [https://
perma.cc/G3P8-MCPU]. 
 16 See Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Pov-
erty and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (detailing how residents of rural counties in Montana 
are least-served by local government); Anna Williams Shavers, Rethinking the Equity vs. Adequacy 
Debate: Implications for Rural School Finance Reform Litigation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 133, 140 (2003) 
(discussing inequitable rural access to education opportunities); Thomas F. Martin II, Note, The Stark 
Inaccessibility of Medical Care in Rural Indiana: Judicial and Legislative Solutions, 11 IND. HEALTH 
L. REV. 831, 832–33 (2014). See generally Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Ignoring the Rural Under-
class: The Biases of Federal Housing Policy, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 191 (1990) (explaining that 
while thirty percent of poor individuals live in rural areas, rural residents receive only about twenty 
percent of federal, state, and local anti-poverty measures and live with higher rates of substandard 
housing); Keith Bauer, Distributive Justice and Rural Healthcare: A Case for E-Health, 17 INT’L J. 
APPLIED PHIL. 241 (2003) (stating that twenty percent of the U.S. population lives in rural areas but 
only nine percent of physicians practice there); Linda L. Chezem, Public Health Law & Equal Access 
to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 529 (2014) (discussing the public health disparities in 
rural communities); Allen S. Hammond, The FCC’s Third Report on Broadband Deployment: Inequi-
table, Untimely and Unreasonable, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 539, 548 (2002) (discussing the 
inequitable distribution of broadband services to rural and inner-city communities); Katherine Porter, 
Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 969 (offering an 
empirical analysis that suggests that rural families face more economic hardship than their urban 
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today’s discourse on rural communities requires a more robust exploration of 
how distributional decisions shape rural conditions and whether those deci-
sions are “just,” an exploration that this Article offers.17 
The Article’s second argument focuses more directly on the rural socioec-
onomic decline that has garnered attention of late, and on a subtler version of 
distributive injustice that is also absent from the current discourse. This argu-
ment is that unacknowledged utilitarianism—a form of distributive injustice in 
which the majority makes discrete populations worse off in the name of help-
ing “everyone”—has also contributed to today’s rural challenges.18 This argu-
ment does not dispute globalization and automation’s role in rural decline. Ra-
ther, it critiques the legal frameworks that have shaped rural livelihoods in the 
agriculture, resource extraction, and manufacturing sectors for the past several 
decades. This critique shows that, time and again, public decisionmakers trad-
ed rural welfare for some perceived collective benefit. Through their efforts to 
make society’s pie of benefits larger, public decisionmakers reduced the size of 
the rural slice, raising the question of whether this redistribution was “just.” 
Legal and policy developments in these three sectors reveal this pattern of 
undermining rural people and places for at least nominal societal benefit. In the 
farming sector, President Nixon’s Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, champi-
oned a novel vision of agriculture as “a highly profitable commodity for a 
handful of . . . producers and processers.”19 After this vision became more 
mainstream, the displacement of family farms and the rise of legal regimes 
friendly to polluting agribusiness continued to undercut small operations that 
had more symbiotic relationships with communities and neighbors.20 Even 
                                                                                                                           
counterparts); Lisa R. Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts: A Multi-State Perspective on Rural Access to Jus-
tice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2018) [hereinafter Pruitt et al., Legal Deserts] (discussing the 
lack of legal resources in rural areas). 
 17 Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2018) 
(arguing that “important welfare-enhancing regulations” are likely to be derailed in the future if poli-
cymakers continue “[i]gnoring the pleas of communities that disproportionately suffer serious 
harms”). 
 18 See Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1061–62 
(2003) (defining utilitarianism as the principle that distributive decisions should lead to “the greatest 
good for the greatest number”); Revesz, supra note 17, at 1491 (discussing widespread acceptance of 
the idea that legal rules should focus on “increasing the size of the pie (maximizing net benefits), and 
not the size of each slice (distribution),” while explaining that such a view does not necessarily mean 
distributional concerns are unimportant). 
 19 Bekah Mandell, Feasts of Oz: Class, Food, and the Rise of Global Capitalism, 20 S. CAL. IN-
TERDISC. L.J. 93, 101 (2010); see Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 17–18 (observing that Butz is 
often inaccurately credited with implementing consolidation-friendly programs—such as ending pro-
duction control for corn and urging farmers to “get big or get out”—when in fact earlier directors of 
the USDA started them). 
 20 JOEL DYER, HARVEST OF RAGE: WHY OKLAHOMA CITY IS ONLY THE BEGINNING 13, 17, 70, 
112–14 (1997); Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 19. 
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since the displacement of small farmers reached “crisis” level in the 1980s, 
state and federal policymakers have consistently favored consolidation and 
industrialization. These trends reduced the number of farms, the number of 
farm jobs, and local residents’ ability to influence land use decisions—
weakening farm communities and devolving them into mere staging grounds 
for often hazardous industrial activity.21 Yet, these measures have been justi-
fied by “the greater good.” Small farms are “inefficient,” while industrialized 
agriculture can purportedly “feed the world.”22 
In the extractive sector, for much of the twentieth century, the environ-
mental and socioeconomic devastation associated with coal mining was ad-
dressed with only anemic reforms in measures such as the lackluster Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.23 As damaging as an extractive economy 
was, it provided a form of sustenance. But after using rural communities for 
cheap, reliable energy, public actors failed to respond to the foreseeable de-
cline of extractive jobs even as they encouraged a transition towards more effi-
cient and cleaner energy production. This left communities with little to show 
for their decades-long contribution to the nation’s energy grid.24 
In manufacturing, plant closures fell harder on rural communities because 
of their more limited economies.25 Measures to mitigate mass layoffs came 
reluctantly in response to demands by betrayed laborers. Yet, these measures, 
such as the Trade Act of 1974 and the Worker Adjustment Retraining and Noti-
                                                                                                                           
 21 See Jonathan W. Coppess, High Cotton and the Low Road: An Unraveling Farm Bill Coalition 
and Its Implications, 23 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 353, 370 (2018) (discussing how farm consolidation has 
increased since the farm crisis of the 1980s); Neil D. Hamilton, Harvesting the Law: Personal Reflec-
tions on Thirty Years of Change in Agricultural Legislation, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 563, 567 (2013) 
[hereinafter Hamilton, Harvesting the Law] (describing the “Big Ag” period characterizing the 1980s 
to the present, with some present-day evolution toward food localism, as with Community-Supported 
Agriculture programs); Neil D. Hamilton, Myth Making in the Heartland—Did Agriculture Elect the 
New President?, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 5, 10 (2017) [hereinafter Hamilton, Myth Making] 
(“[S]tructural shifts—in land tenure, farm consolidation and livestock production—are often facilitat-
ed by public programs such as farm income support, crop insurance, the RFS, and farm lending prac-
tices.”); Mandell, supra note 19, at 101–02 (“[Secretary Butz’s focus] on the mechanization, industri-
alization, and commoditization of agriculture required larger investments in capital than traditional 
farming. The increasing need to invest heavily in equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides in 
order to stay competitive meant that only farmers with access to capital could remain competitive 
under the new system.”); Merrett & Struthers, supra note 6, at 36. 
 22 See Neil D. Hamilton, Moving Toward Food Democracy: Better Food, New Farmers, and the 
Myth of Feeding the World, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 117, 121 (2011). 
 23 Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmental and Social In-
justice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 304, 330, 422 (2013). 
 24 Ann Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 300–08 (2019); Revesz, supra note 
17, at 1543–55. 
 25 Anderson, supra note 8, at 465–68; see Revesz, supra note 17, at 1498 (“Our regulatory system 
has grappled for almost a half century with the question of how to deal with regulations that displace 
workers in communities where there are few other employment options.”). 
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fication Act of 1988, failed to adequately mitigate losses imposed on workers 
and communities.26 Meanwhile, the subsequent proliferation of rural blight—
with emptying communities hampered by widespread property vacancy and 
abandonment—has largely gone unaddressed.27 Like in the agricultural and 
extractive sectors, the reduction of trade restrictions, with minimal mitigation 
measures for affected individuals and communities, were justified by collective 
benefits: a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and greater consumer access 
to cheaper goods.28 
Developments in each of these sectors—from small farms to industrial-
ized ones, from the use of fossil fuels to their decline, and from manufacturing 
jobs to outsourcing—have been justified by aggregate benefits: respectively, 
cheap energy then clean energy, cheap and abundant food, and cheap goods 
and a higher GDP.29 The rural America in decline did not just “die.” By bear-
ing disproportionate economic losses alongside substantial environmental bur-
dens—rationalized in the name of collective welfare—these communities were 
sacrificed.30 
It might be argued that concentrating losses and burdens on certain popula-
tions is an inevitable part of a functioning society.31 The problem is that legal 
theorists and philosophers widely consider utilitarian rationales for suffering to 
be ethically repugnant.32 According to distributive justice theorists, measures 
that impose burdens on discrete groups in the name of aggregate welfare should 
be treated with strong skepticism.33 Although benefits that offset the burdens—
such as rural residents’ joint enjoyment of cheap or clean energy, cheap food, 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America’s Eroding Indus-
trial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1868 (1993). 
 27 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 5 (discussing proliferation of rural property vacancy, di-
lapidation, and lack of attention to the issue from scholarship, public commentary, and policymakers). 
 28 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 29 See infra notes 207–320. 
 30 See Porter, supra note 10 (describing rural economic decline of past quarter century as “relent-
less” and reflective of an “intensifying ruralization of distress”). 
 31 Cf. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4, 7 (2003) (ob-
serving that society must be able to “revise and update rules” in the public welfare); Kaswan, supra 
note 18, at 1062 (arguing that distributive justice does not require “strict equality”); Frank I. Michel-
man, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” 
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1967) (recognizing the constitutional distinction between valid 
exercise of police power for which a person bears losses by being “regulated,” versus compensable 
injuries for loss of property in the public name). 
 32 See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 14 (utilitarianism is “inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity 
implicit in the notion of a well-ordered society”); Kaswan, supra note 18, at 1062; Michelman, supra 
note 31, at 1166 (discussing wide recognition of the injustice inherent in the expectation that “one 
man should [. . . be compelled to die] for the people”) (alteration in original). 
 33 Michelman, supra note 31, at 1174; see Joseph L. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights? The 
National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 510–11 (1984) (discussing 
ethical tensions surrounding local subordination to national interests). 
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and cheap goods—might render rural sacrifices just, it is not clear that the most 
affected rural communities have had any losses offset.34 What is the demise of 
an entire town worth, after all?35 
The discussion’s third argument follows once distributive injustice and 
majoritarian utilitarianism are established as contributors to rural challenges. 
Because rural inequity is a collective problem, the onus falls on society as a 
whole to address today’s rural marginalization.36 To avoid past mistakes—
recreating arbitrary or cruel choices about winners and losers, or embracing the 
trap of utilitarian thinking—the clearest solution to addressing rural challenges 
is a more robust approach to societal inequity in general. This includes ensur-
ing access to decent work and decent environments for all. These measures are 
captured in part in federal policy proposals such as the Green New Deal, a po-
tential “massive program of investments in clean-energy jobs and infrastruc-
ture, meant to transform not just the energy sector, but the entire economy.”37 
Such legislation, designed “to make [the economy] fairer and more just,” 
would chip away at persistent rural poverty, make the loss of traditional liveli-
hoods somewhat less devastating, and potentially help offset localized envi-
ronmental hazards.38 These protections are urgent needs for urban communities 
treated inequitably, as well.39 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See generally Michelman, supra note 31 (discussing the prospect that adequately providing 
offsetting benefits to “losers” in allocative decisions might “induce losers to quit their objections to 
the change”). 
 35 Cf. Anderson, supra note 8, at 499–500 (contemplating innate and practical values to facilitating a 
rural way of life); Alana Semuels, Ghost Towns of the 21st Century, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/ghost-towns-of-the-21st-century/411343/ [https://
perma.cc/92HN-V5N7] (discussing the proliferation of rural ghost towns as a result of deindustrializa-
tion). 
 36 This Article presumes that the idea of collective responsibility “makes sense as a form of moral 
responsibility.” Collective Responsibility, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/collective-responsibility/ [https://perma.cc/X85C-2T3C]. Defenders of this 
idea argue “that we blame groups all the time in practice and . . . in a way that is difficult to analyze 
with the precepts of methodological individualism”; that “within our practices of moral responsibility 
. . . groups have the ability of moral address and exhibit moral competence”; and that linguistic anal-
yses, existentialist traditions, and social theory suggest that it is possible to ascribe group blame. Id. 
 37 David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, VOX (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.vox.com/
energy-and-environment/2018/12/21/18144138/green-new-deal-alexandria-ocasio-cortez [https://perma.
cc/F2JX-BMJ3]; see Brigham Daniels et al., Just Environmentalism, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 
(2018) (discussing a need to account for more varied forms of distributive injustice in environmental 
decision making than those traditionally considered). 
 38 See Lisa Archer, Opinion, Green New Deal Must Transform Our Food System to Save Our 
Climate, FOOD TANK (Feb. 2019), https://foodtank.com/news/2019/02/opinion-green-new-deal-must-
transform-our-food-system-to-save-our-climate/ [https://perma.cc/D2CB-9XRN] (arguing that the 
Green New Deal would help address rural poverty by promoting organic, sustainable farming over 
industrialized agriculture); Roberts, supra note 37. 
 39 See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273 (2003) (discussing different 
types of challenges facing urban and rural communities). 
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The discussion finishes with brief consideration of better-tailored ap-
proaches to rural marginalization.40 The first step is for policymakers to recog-
nize that rural communities warrant equitable treatment and are not merely 
means to collective ends. Policymakers should coordinate more with rural res-
idents themselves to better understand their needs.41 Efforts to address rural 
poverty should be re-energized. For communities in decline, local governments 
have important, under-discussed potential for rural reform. They are well posi-
tioned to serve as vehicles for more robust community economic develop-
ment—or at least for better-managed decline.42 Yet, one is hard-pressed to 
avoid the conclusion that the remedy to distributive injustice is distributive 
justice; the desire for a resource-free solution is unrealistic. Policy choices and 
neglectful inaction have contributed to disproportionately low rates of re-
sources per capita directed to rural residents, undercut traditional livelihoods, 
and undermined public services. Policymakers must thus ensure a more equi-
table allocation of society’s benefits and burdens to rural communities in need. 
Skeptics of this narrative and these solutions will raise several questions. 
First, is it possible to generalize about rural challenges despite rural variability 
in residents’ race, class, and region?43 Second, in light of rural voters’ dispro-
portionate power in bodies such as the U.S. Senate and the electoral college, 
can they experience inequity, and do they even want help?44 Third, even if 
                                                                                                                           
 40 For a more in-depth discussion, see Ann M. Eisenberg, Economic Regulation and Rural Ameri-
ca (working draft on file with author). 
 41 See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159, 159–60 (2006) (discussing courts’ 
urban-centric decision making that tends to view rurality through a lens of nostalgia for an idyllic, 
stereotyped past); Jean Hardy, How Rural America Is Saving Itself, CITYLAB (Dec. 20, 2018), https://
www.citylab.com/perspective/2018/12/rural-america-us-economic-future-new-york-times-wrong/
578740/ [https://perma.cc/D66L-BKTZ] (“The insistence that no one out there knows how to solve 
problems of the rural economy is a false and misleading one. There are decades of research that have 
identified paths forward that rural communities are already following and flourishing on.”). 
 42 See Anderson, supra note 8, at 501; cf. Noah Smith, Opinion, How to Save the Troubled Amer-
ican Heartland, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-08-
03/how-to-save-the-troubled-american-heartland [https://perma.cc/ZYV6-YXDV] (arguing that not 
every rural place can be revitalized, but a strategic allocation of local government resources can help 
those places poised to recover). See generally Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched 
Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2014) (discussing rural residents’ 
difficulties accessing basic services); Hardy, supra note 41 (arguing that state legislatures have under-
funded rural localities in the first part of the 21st century, resulting in a less talented work-force in 
those communities, crumbling local infrastructure, and insufficient funding for local school systems). 
 43 Cf. Pruitt & Showman, supra note 42, at 475 (discussing the adage that “if you’ve seen one 
rural place, you’ve seen one rural place”). 
 44 See Emily Badger, As American as Apple Pie? The Rural Vote’s Disproportionate Slice of 
Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/upshot/as-american-as-
apple-pie-the-rural-votes-disproportionate-slice-of-power.html [https://perma.cc/Z7GC-B6DX] (de-
tailing how “rural America, even as it laments its economic weakness, retains vastly disproportionate 
electoral strength”). 
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most rural residents want more government intervention, would such interven-
tions not be prohibitively costly? Finally, is the burden on society to rectify 
this problem, or should rural residents just move to more livable environs? 
These concerns are addressed throughout this Article. Of course, it is dif-
ficult to characterize all of “rural America”—a geographic label encompassing 
seventy-five percent of the nation’s land and between fifteen to twenty percent 
of its people.45 But this Article insists that it is worth looking for common 
themes in the rural experience and to redirect this conversation. The fact re-
mains that most people, including academics and journalists, live in cities and 
remain uninitiated to rural challenges. These challenges are central to under-
standing today’s politics, disputes like those seen at Standing Rock, and the 
daily quality of life for those of us who enjoy cheap energy, food, and goods.46 
It is hoped that the subsequent analysis will capture diverse rural experienc-
es—encompassing not just the mythic “Trump country,” but also those who 
lost cotton mill jobs in African-American communities in the South, coal jobs 
in Native-American communities in the West, and farmland in diverse places, 
while also bearing burdens of widespread blight and the hazards of unsustaina-
ble agribusiness and natural resource extraction.47 
This Article’s alternate narrative at least partially answers the two ques-
tions above—what happened to rural America and what should be done about 
it?—in more illuminating terms than the dominant discourse’s resignation to 
rural America’s natural death. This narrative illustrates that although rural mar-
ginalization is complex, its contours are finite and comprehensible, and there is 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Kenneth M. Johnson, Where Is Rural America and Who Lives There?, in RURAL POVERTY 
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 3, 3 (explaining that “rural America is a simple term describ-
ing a remarkably diverse collection of people and places”). Over fifty million Americans live in areas 
defined as rural. Id. 
 46 Cf. Daniel T. Lichter & David L. Brown, The New Rural-Urban Interface: Lessons for Higher 
Education, 29 CHOICES 1, 1 (2014) (asserting that the question of how rural America can reverse its 
decline “seems hardly a priority for most Americans living in big cities and suburbs; they often know 
little or nothing about day-to-day life in small towns or in the countryside”). 
 47 See generally DYER, supra note 20 (discussing widespread displacement of farmers and haz-
ards of industrialized agriculture); Judy Bainbridge, How Black Workers Changed the Textile Industry 
in South Carolina, GREENVILLE NEWS (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/
news/2018/10/29/how-black-workers-changed-textile-industry-south-carolina/1798644002/ [https://
perma.cc/Q7EM-HLUK] (discussing black workers’ significant contribution to South Carolina’s tex-
tile industry in the 1970s, and the mass layoffs that followed in the 1980s due to increased automation 
and cheap labor abroad); Joe Rigert, Letter to the Editor, Native Americans and Coal: The Risks of 
Dependency, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/opinion/native-
americans-and-coal-the-risks-of-dependency.html [https://perma.cc/SP5Z-C3ZH] (pointing out the 
risk Native-American tribes run in depending on coal industry); Claire E. Jamieson, Change in the 
Textile Mill Villages of South Carolina’s Upstate During the Modern South Era 3 (May 2010) (un-
published M.A. thesis, University of Tennessee), https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1298&context=utk_gradthes [https://perma.
cc/2UGP-V952] (detailing how a loss of mill jobs has “transformed” southern textile towns). 
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a normative case for addressing it through law. It reveals that the rural story is 
not morally neutral but infused with value judgments that determine winners 
and losers. It also shows that our concepts of potential solutions—or lack 
thereof—are shaped by value judgments, rather than by forces of nature. At the 
very least, this narrative insists that we must all grapple with these difficult 
questions rather than leaving them to the purview of technocrats, political agi-
tators, or struggling small-town governments. To not do so risks further injus-
tice and deepening the urban-rural polarization that threatens the fabric of na-
tional democracy.48 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the com-
munities this Article contemplates, differentiating between a rural America bur-
dened with chronic poverty and a rural America burdened with socioeconomic 
decline.49 Part II discusses various theories of distributive justice and their un-
der-explored relevance to the rural condition.50 Part III.A argues that disparities 
in resource allocations between urban and rural communities are an instance of 
distributive injustice, with those disparities falling harder on chronically impov-
erished communities.51 Part III.B critiques legal frameworks that have shaped 
key rural livelihoods for the past several decades and argues that policymakers’ 
majoritarian-utilitarian treatment of rural livelihoods also effectuated distributive 
injustice, with these developments affecting communities in decline more poign-
antly.52 Part IV offers preliminary contemplation of solutions.53 
I. UNDERSTANDING TODAY’S RURAL LANDSCAPE 
This Part provides a broad overview of modern rural America and the 
problems its residents face. Section A differentiates among four categories of 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Cf. Lee Drutman, We Need Political Parties. But Their Rabid Partisanship Could Destroy 
American Democracy., VOX (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/9/5/16227700/
hyperpartisanship-identity-american-democracy-problems-solutions-doom-loop [https://perma.cc/
8RUJ-P4CM] (discussing an American political partisanship increasingly characterized in terms of the 
“urban/rural partisan divide” and “separate tribal epistemologies”). Rural or white working-class 
“economic anxiety” is sometimes framed as a driver of politics that is mutually exclusive with racism 
or xenophobia as political drivers. By acknowledging rural inequity, this Article is not intended to 
suggest that racism and xenophobia are not also urgent problems in today’s political landscape. This 
discussion also does not attempt to discern or explain rural Trump voters’ motivations, although such 
connections may surface. Cf. Tyler T. Reny et al., Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial 
and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting, 83 PUB. OPINION Q. 91, 91 
(2019) (seeking to explain whether “immigration and racial attitudes or economic dislocation and 
marginality” were greater causes of the white working class’s “vote switching” in the 2016 election). 
 49 See infra notes 54–134 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 135–179 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 186–202 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 203–320 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 321–332 and accompanying text. 
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economic trends that capture the bulk of what today’s rural communities are 
experiencing.54 Section B discusses chronic rural poverty specifically.55 Sec-
tion C provides an overview of the transformation of the rural economy over 
the past century.56 Finally, Section D establishes rurality as an intersectional 
concept that interacts with other bases of marginalization, such as race, gender, 
age, national origin, and class.57 
A. Differentiating the Four Rural Americas 
To understand rural communities in the United States, it is important to 
understand basic characteristics of urban-rural relations that typically occupy 
scholars outside the legal field. Urban and rural communities are interdepend-
ent; some even challenge the idea that they should be considered distinguisha-
ble types of places.58 Yet, rural communities tend to be the locus for certain 
productive activities. Farming, natural resource extraction, energy production, 
forestry, and outdoor recreation necessarily take place predominantly in rural 
communities.59 Urban communities depend upon these rural activities. At the 
same time, rural communities depend on urban communities for other benefits, 
such as recreation-seeking tourists and peripheral economic effects from large 
urban labor markets through regional diffusion of wealth, information, and 
work opportunities.60 Global trends suggest these relationships may be funda-
mentally evolving as urbanization intensifies around the world.61 But rural 
populations persist and likely will into the future.62 
 A common question is how “rural” should be defined. Most agree that a 
spectrum best characterizes differing types of populations and landscapes, with 
extreme urbanity on the one end and extreme rurality on the other.63 Formal 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 81–121 and accompanying text. 
 57 See infra notes 122–134 and accompanying text. 
58 Daniel T. Lichter & James P. Ziliak, The Rural-Urban Interface: New Patterns of Spatial In-
terdependence and Inequality in America, 672 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 9 (2017). 
 59 Id. at 8. 
 60 Id. at 8, 17–18. 
 61 See generally GLOBAL URBANIZATION (Eugenie L. Birch & Susan M. Wachter eds., 2011). 
 62 Cf. Christopher Ingraham, Americans Say There’s Not Much Appeal to Big-City Living. Why 
Do So Many of Us Live There?, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2018/12/18/americans-say-theres-not-much-appeal-big-city-living-why-do-so-many-us-live-
there/ [https://perma.cc/Q6GD-A6HE] (discussing a poll showing that a plurality of Americans would 
prefer to live in a rural area over a city, small city, or suburb); Sarah Smarsh, Opinion, Something 
Special Is Happening in Rural America, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/17/opinion/rural-america.html [https://perma.cc/F2XE-B86R] (describing a “brain gain” 
currently taking place in rural America). 
 63 Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 200. 
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definitions characterize rurality by population scarcity, low population vol-
umes, and distance from substantial population centers. For example, the 
commonly used U.S. Census Bureau definition defines “rural” as anything 
other than (1) an Urbanized Area of 50,000 or more people, or (2) Urban Clus-
ters of between 2,500 and 50,000 people.64 But formal legal definitions, of 
which there are many, are not necessarily the best metrics by which to under-
stand rural America today. This Article takes a somewhat broader view; an iso-
lated town of 2,501 people is likely to face similar challenges as one that has a 
population of 2,499.65 
 Still, rural communities’ diversity—in topography, population, history, 
and industrial activity—makes generalizations difficult. Rural America in-
cludes not only some of the world’s best farmland (in the Great Plains and the 
Corn Belt, for instance), high-producing dairy regions (such as in Upstate New 
York, Wisconsin, and New England), but also: 
sprawling exurban areas on the outer edges of the nation’s largest 
metropolitan areas; the vast arid range and desert lands in the 
Southwest; the deep, mountainous forests of the Pacific Northwest; 
the flat and humid coastal plain of the Southeast; the hardscrabble 
towns and hollows of the Appalachians; the rocky shorelines and 
working forests of New England, where rural villages look much as 
they did a hundred years ago; and the glaciers and fjords of Alas-
ka.66 
This diversity notwithstanding, common trends across these landscapes 
and populations can be identified. Researchers at the Carsey Institute have 
formulated a useful typology of rural places that helps narrow and define the 
subjects of this Article. This typology describes four rural Americas, each 
shaped by a handful of key differing factors that reflect how economic activity 
does or does not sustain them. The four rural Americas include: (1) amenity-
rich rural America; (2) chronically poor rural America; (3) declining resource-
dependent rural America; and (4) amenity/decline rural America, which is an 
“in-between” category.67 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Urban and Rural, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/
guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/8V3C-2ASB]. 
 65 Cf. Lichter & Ziliak, supra note 58, at 10 (noting that “[f]ew scholars . . . embrace [the Census 
Bureau’s] narrow definition . . . , instead preferring to use the Census Bureau’s official definition of 
nonmetropolitan interchangeably with rural”). 
 66 Johnson, supra note 45, at 3–4. 
 67 LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON ET AL., CARSEY INST., UNIV. OF N.H., PLACE MATTERS: CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN FOUR RURAL AMERICAS 26–28 (2008). 
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This Article is least concerned with the first and last categories. Although 
amenity-rich rural places do have challenges, such as gentrification, inequality, 
and access to quality jobs, their concerns more closely resemble those seen in 
urban places. Being rural is not as much of a concern for relatively affluent 
places like Aspen and Vail, Colorado, for instance.68 Category four, with its 
decline and amenities frequently cancelling each other out, is also not the cen-
tral focus of this Article, although it shares some commonalities with catego-
ries two and three. 
This Article centers on the two most extreme forms of today’s rural dis-
tress: chronically poor communities and communities in decline. Although to-
day’s dominant discourse focuses more on communities in decline, part of this 
Article’s argument is that the discussion should also include chronically poor 
communities. For purposes of the subsequent discussion, each category corre-
sponds more closely with one type of distributive injustice that this Article 
seeks to articulate. 
According to the Carsey Institute’s report, chronically poor rural America 
shares some similarities with declining rural America.69 Both communities are 
concerned about crime, drugs, and employment opportunities. Two main dif-
ferences are that chronically poor rural America has lost less population and is 
constituted of more non-white populations, particularly African Americans.70 
This category describes substantial parts of the rural South including central 
Appalachia, many Native-American reservations, and other pockets of concen-
trated poverty across Western states. 
The declining communities referenced by category three are predominantly 
white, comprised mostly of at least second-generation residents who grew up in 
the area and remained there long-term. The decline is largely driven by young 
adults leaving. In addition to population loss, job opportunities and drug manu-
facturing and sales are prominent regional problems.71 These declining commu-
nities are the places that this Article has in mind when it turns to the utilitarian 
sacrifice of rural communities for the greater good, although resource disparities 
also affect these localities. This category describes parts of Appalachia, the dein-
dustrializing Midwest, and timber communities in the Pacific Northwest. 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Nicholas Riccardi, Aspen Split Between Wealthy Visitors and the Working Poor That Serve 
Them, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 12, 2015), https://skift.com/2015/01/12/aspen-split-between-wealthy-
visitors-and-the-working-poor-that-serve-them/ [https://perma.cc/5LC2-7C8F]. 
 69 HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 67, at 27. 
 70 Id. Chronically poor rural America also has lower educational attainment, lower household 
incomes, fewer elderly residents, and a higher reliance on food stamps. Id. 
 71 Id. at 26. 
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B. Background on Chronic Rural Poverty 
Chronic rural poverty, the issue that most directly affects category two 
communities, has a long and difficult history. Although it is usually measured 
as an economic phenomenon by departments such as the U.S. Census Bureau, 
poverty may be defined as “a multidimensional concept that involves insuffi-
cient income relative to need and limited access to resources such as education, 
health care, and social and political power.”72 
The persistence of rural poverty is one feature that may set it apart from 
urban poverty. Rural poverty emerged as a national policy issue in the 1930s, 
when the Great Depression drew attention to dire living conditions for certain 
populations outside cities.73 In 1968, a report from the President’s National 
Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty stated, “Rural poverty is so wide-
spread, and so acute, as to be a national disgrace[.]”74 The Johnson administra-
tion’s War on Poverty began in 1964 and created a legislative framework large-
ly still in effect today. The War on Poverty made notable dents in rural chal-
lenges.75 
In spite of these improvements, rural poverty has proven more difficult to 
eradicate than urban poverty.76 Since 1959, poverty rates in rural America have 
outpaced their urban counterparts.77 And recent trends highlight growing cause 
for concern. As of 2009–2013, roughly one-quarter of U.S. counties were con-
sidered high poverty counties, a seventy percent increase from 1999 (when 
sixteen percent of counties were high poverty). These high-poverty counties 
were disproportionately rural. Over this period, approximately one-third of 
rural counties were considered high-poverty, compared to one-sixth of metro 
counties.78  
Thus, concentrated, chronic rural poverty remains a substantial problem 
today. Chronic rural poverty is exacerbated by rural socioeconomic decline. 
Yet, the dominant discourse described above focuses almost entirely on com-
munities in decline. 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Bruce Weber & Kathleen Miller, Poverty in Rural America Then and Now, in RURAL POV-
ERTY, supra note 4, at 28, 38. 
 73 Id. at 35. 
 74 Id. at 31. 
 75 See id. at 39–41 (discussing War on Poverty and stating that rural poverty declined during the 
1960s under the Johnson administration); see also Donald E. Voth, A Brief History and Assessment of 
Federal Rural Development Programs and Policies, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1265, 1272–75 (1995). 
 76 Weber & Miller, supra note 72, at 33. 
 77 Id. at 40. 
 78 Id. at 51. These 828 counties were “concentrated primarily in Appalachia, the southern Black 
Belt and Mississippi Delta, along the Mexican border, and on Native American tribal reservations.” 
Id. at 50. 
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Communities in decline are susceptible to the spread of poverty.79 But the 
inattention to longstanding chronic poverty is a critical problem: communities 
in decline tend to be majority white, while rural communities of color have 
been disproportionately burdened by chronic poverty since well before the on-
set of modern rural decline. As of 2013, rural African Americans had the high-
est incidence of poverty at 37.3%; rural Native Americans had the second 
highest rate at 34.4%; and rural Hispanics had the third highest rate at 28.2%. 
Rural whites, by contrast, experienced a poverty rate of 15.9%, which is simi-
lar to rates of urban poverty.80 Although communities in decline certainly war-
rant attention—and are vulnerable to poverty—a discussion of rural decline 
should also include a discussion of persistent rural poverty. 
C. Background on Rural Economic Transformation 
Despite concerns about rural poverty in the 1960s, rural communities 
were collectively more prosperous in the mid- and late-twentieth century than 
they are now.81 The changing rural landscape stems in large part from changes 
in rural economic activity. 
Rural livelihoods have ebbed and flowed in and out of various sectors 
over the past hundred years, as the nation shifted away from a majority agrari-
an society to an industrialized one.82 The overall effect, though, has been a rel-
atively abrupt transition.83 A century ago, approximately sixty percent of U.S. 
residents lived in rural areas, and forty percent worked on farms.84 Today, ap-
proximately fifteen to twenty percent of U.S. residents live in rural areas, but a 
mere one to two percent work on farms.85 
The past several decades themselves have also seen dramatic transfor-
mations. And contrary to common wisdom, rural livelihoods have never been 
synonymous with agriculture in the modern era. As of 1970, in high-density 
rural areas, agriculture, forestry, fishing, manufacturing, and mining accounted 
for approximately thirty-eight percent of employment altogether, while in low-
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id. at 32 (explaining that most rural poverty is in the Southeast, but deindustrialization since the 
1980s has led to the spread of poverty in the Midwest and Northeast, as did the Great Recession). 
 80 Harvey & Harris, supra note 4, at 146. 
 81 See Porter, supra note 10 (explaining that “[r]ural communities once captured a greater share of 
the nation’s prosperity” and detailing the sustained job creation in rural America during the 1990s). 
 82 Carolyn Dimitri et al., The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm Policy, 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ERS BULL., June 2005, at 2 –5, https://naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/22832/PDF 
[https://perma.cc/DC2L-JF7Y]. 
 83 Cf. STEVEN STOLL, RAMP HOLLOW: THE ORDEAL OF APPALACHIA 28–30 (2017) (observing 
that until only very recently in human history, the vast majority of people were subsistence agrarians). 
 84 Weber & Miller, supra note 72, at 34, 36. 
 85 Id. at 36. 
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density rural areas, these sectors accounted for thirty-six percent of employ-
ment.86  
The already substantial proportions of those employment numbers do not 
paint the full picture of the significance of these traditional rural livelihoods to 
communities dependent upon them. These livelihoods often centered on large-
scale productive activity with a substantial land use or environmental footprint. 
These industries have been distinct from other significant employers, like the 
service or retail sectors, in the magnitude of their presence and their relation-
ships with local governments. Industries such as coal and timber may account 
for millions of dollars in tax revenue through measures such as severance tax-
es, which are then distributed to rural municipalities, counties, and reserva-
tions.87 Thus, although these industries employed just over one-third of resi-
dents,88 their role in a regional way of life often loomed even larger than the 
already-large proportion suggests. 
By 2007, these industries had declined dramatically.89 Over this period, ag-
riculture, forestry, fishing, manufacturing, and mining went from accounting for 
                                                                                                                           
 86 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, STRENGTHENING THE RURAL ECONOMY—THE CURRENT 
STATE OF RURAL AMERICA (2010) [hereinafter CURRENT STATE OF RURAL AMERICA], https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/cea/factsheets-reports/strengthening-the-rural-
economy/the-current-state-of-rural-america [https://perma.cc/P623-6JXH]. The exact breakdown of 
rural livelihoods is as follows: agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for thirteen percent of jobs 
in high-density rural areas and twenty-three percent of jobs in low-density rural areas; manufacturing 
accounted for twenty-three percent of jobs in high-density rural areas and ten percent of jobs in low-
density rural areas; and mining accounted for two percent of jobs in high-density rural areas and three 
percent of jobs in low-density rural areas. Other major sectors included government, the service sec-
tor, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and “other.” Id. 
 87 See RORY MCILMOIL & EVAN HANSEN, DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIES, THE DECLINE OF CEN-
TRAL APPALACHIAN COAL AND THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION 1 (Jan. 19, 2010), http://
www.downstreamstrategies.com/documents/reports_publication/DownstreamStrategies-DeclineOf
CentralAppalachianCoal-FINAL-1-19-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/55PX-6JTJ] (discussing the coal in-
dustry’s role in filling the tax coffers of local governments in Appalachia); see also Anderson, supra 
note 8, at 481 (discussing the relationship between federal timber funds paid in lieu of taxes and re-
gional reliance on the industry in the northwest); Alan Ramo & Deborah Behles, Transitioning a 
Community Away from Fossil-Fuel Generation to a Green Economy: An Approach Using State Utility 
Commission Authority, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 515 (2014) (discussing the tax revenue Hopi 
and Navajo tribes derived from their coal mines); Julie Turkewitz, Tribes That Live Off Coal Hold 
Tight to Trump’s Promises, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/01/us/
trump-coal-promises.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ8M-LHLS] (explaining how half of the Crow Tribe’s 
non-federal budget comes from royalties and taxes on coal extracted from a mine located on the reser-
vation; the mine also supports 170 jobs). 
 88 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 89 CURRENT STATE OF RURAL AMERICA, supra note 86. The exact breakdown of these sectors is 
as follows: agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for six percent of jobs in high-density areas 
and twelve percent in low-density areas; manufacturing accounted for thirteen percent of jobs in high-
density rural areas and seven percent in low-density rural areas; and mining accounted for one percent 
in high-density rural areas and three percent in low-density rural areas. Id. 
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more than one-third of rural employment to less than one-fifth.90 The localized 
effects have been more dramatic for many communities, however. In rural 
Southeast Alaska, forestry was once the region’s economic driver, providing a 
peak of 3,400 jobs in 1990; this figure dropped to just 214 in 2009.91 As of 2011, 
seventy-five percent of residents believed that the loss of forestry jobs was nega-
tively affecting their communities.92 In North Carolina, manufacturing jobs 
dropped from 761,000 in 2000 to 429,000 in 2010, a drop of forty-four percent 
that disproportionately affected rural communities.93 Former timber communi-
ties of the Pacific Northwest are still in crisis following reductions in timbering 
on public lands.94 Meanwhile, coal communities in central Appalachia struggle 
with a fully collapsed regional economy.95 Iowa has lost thirty percent of its 
farms since 1977.96 The story may differ depending upon the region in question, 
but common themes are change and loss of a way of life. 
These data show that the makeup of rural livelihoods has shifted substan-
tially in modern U.S. history. Yet, it does not appear that these sectors have 
been replaced by new ones. Over the course of the same time period, economic 
growth has disproportionately benefited large urban centers.97 With the eco-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. (detailing how traditional rural livelihoods once made up roughly thirty-six to thirty-
eight percent of rural employment; that number has decreased to roughly twenty percent). Since some 
of these livelihoods—such as forestry and mining—are rural by nature, changes in those livelihoods 
had less of an effect on urban communities. The numbers may look similar for manufacturing in urban 
places: in 1970, twenty-five percent of the workforce as a whole worked in manufacturing, compared 
to 8.5% today. Sara Bauerle Danzman & Jeff D. Colgan, Robots Aren’t Killing the American Dream. 
Neither Is Trade. This Is the Problem., WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/03/10/robots-arent-killing-the-american-dream-neither-is-trade-this-
is-the-real-problem/ [https://perma.cc/5JV4-UZ6M]. These losses in manufacturing, however, have 
had a more substantial impact on rural communities. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 467–68. 
 91 THOMAS G. SAFFORD ET AL., CARSEY INST., UNIV. OF N.H., JOBS, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND 
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE: A SURVEY OF SOUTHEAST ALASKANS ABOUT SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL CHANGE 14 (2011). 
 92 Id. at 5. 
 93 David L. Carlton & Peter A. Coclanis, The Roots of Southern Deindustrialization, 61 CHAL-
LENGE 418, 418 (2018). 
 94 Anderson, supra note 8, at 471 (describing the “crisis” in Oregon timber industry). 
 95 See CALVIN A. KENT, NAT’L ASS’N OF CTYS., THE CRUEL COAL FACTS: THE IMPACT ON 
WEST VIRGINIA COUNTIES FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE COAL ECONOMY 1 (2016), http://www.
cbermu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2016-09-Cruel_Coal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X7C-LN6G] 
(stating that the “38 percent decline in West Virginia coal production plus the 71 percent fall in coal 
prices since 2008 have led to a collapse of the State’s coal economy”). 
 96 Matthew Patane, How We Got Here: Iowa Farms Grow in Size, but There Are Fewer of Them, 
CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE (June 17, 2019), https://www.thegazette.com/IowaIdeas/stories/agriculture/
how-we-got-here-iowa-farms-grow-in-size-but-there-are-fewer-of-them-family-farms-consolidation-
iowa-state-research-20180623 [https://perma.cc/6ZNP-4XK6]. 
 97 See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOY-
MENT (2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/employment-education/
rural-employment-and-unemployment/ [https://perma.cc/92RE-X6FS] [hereinafter RURAL EMPLOY-
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nomic recession of 2008, rural communities as a whole fell below zero popula-
tion growth for the first time in the country’s history.98 This relatively novel 
concentration of economic losses on rural places suggests that a distributive 
justice inquiry is warranted. 
The ripple effects of this economic decline have been severe. Mass migra-
tion to cities due to the changing economic landscape has affected both the 
physical and the social rural landscape.99 Shrunken populations have a ripple 
effect on communities’ already-precarious economic health.100 As populations 
shrink, local governments receive less tax revenue, and are in turn less able to 
provide basic services, such as police protection.101 Homes and businesses 
stand empty, and as they fall into disrepair, they impose a new burden on cash-
strapped local governments.102 Rural hospitals and libraries have closed 
throughout the country, leaving remaining residents under-served.103 As the 
built and infrastructural environment decays, new potential residents and in-
vestors are drawn to more livable places.104 Young people continue to move 
                                                                                                                           
MENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT] (explaining that while urban communities have recovered from the 
Great Recession, rural employment rates remain low compared to pre-recession levels); Carlton & 
Coclanis, supra note 93, at 419 (asserting that a loss of rural jobs “has disproportionately hit the 
small-town and rural South, particularly its heavily white populations, and has opened up enormous 
disparities between these areas and the larger cities of the region”); Evert Meijers & Dick van der 
Wouw, Struggles and Strategies of Rural Regions in the Age of the ‘Urban Triumph,’ 66 J. RURAL 
STUD. 21, 21–22 (2019). 
 98 JOHN CROMARTIE, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL AREAS SHOW 
OVERALL POPULATION DECLINE AND SHIFTING REGIONAL PATTERNS OF POPULATION CHANGE 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/september/rural-areas-show-overall-
population-decline-and-shifting-regional-patterns-of-population-change/ [https://perma.cc/7TNK-
VPJF]; THOMAS HERTZ ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL EMPLOY-
MENT IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2014/
october/rural-employment-in-recession-and-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/426U-RXHN]. 
 99 See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 187–88. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 197. 
 102 Id. at 193. 
 103 Sheldon Weisgrau, Issues in Rural Health: Access, Hospitals, and Reform, 17 HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING REV. 1, 1–7 (1995); see Jon Marcus & Matt Krupnick, The Rural Higher-Education Cri-
sis, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-
rural-higher-education-crisis/541188/ [https://perma.cc/XHW4-ZJTS] (explaining that rural areas 
must “contend with drug and mental-health issues, poverty, and a lack of high-speed access to the 
internet”); see also Darrell M. West & Jack Karsten, Rural and Urban America Divided by Broad-
band Access, BROOKINGS BLOG (July 18, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/07/
18/rural-and-urban-america-divided-by-broadband-access/ [https://perma.cc/22MM-ZQXM] (detail-
ing how rural areas have slower broadband than urban areas). 
 104 See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 187–88. 
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away because of a lack of opportunity.105 Meanwhile, disproportionate rural 
“deaths of despair” by opioids or suicide persist.106 
Yet, the nature of the industries that left these communities did not allow 
for a clean break. Traditional rural livelihoods meant that longstanding indus-
trial activities left legacies beyond lost jobs and socioeconomic despair. The 
quality of water and air in mining communities remains precarious, for exam-
ple; many of the mountaintops of the Appalachian mountain range have been 
permanently felled to retrieve coal.107 Power plants like the Navajo Generating 
Station have “fouled the air and scarred the land that the tribe holds sacred.”108 
Mill towns struggle to remediate the manufacturing centers-turned-
brownfields.109 And the pollutants emitted by large agribusiness operations that 
displaced residents and transformed communities often go unchecked.110 
The past several decades are also significant because of two transitional 
moments that hint at alternative historical paths not traveled. First, during the 
1970s, the already-declining rural population seemed to have balanced out. In 
a period known as the “rural renaissance,” rural areas in fact grew at a faster 
rate than cities.111 Yet, certain legal and economic developments, among them 
the aforementioned globalization and automation trends, seem to have steered 
rural America downward starting just after that era. More recently, the 2008 
Great Recession proved another decisive event. Widespread housing and busi-
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Semuels, supra note 9. 
 106 See OVERDOSE DEATH RATES, supra note 11 (explaining that the opioid crisis is having par-
ticularly harsh effects on rural areas); RURAL EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, supra note 97; 
Brian Thiede et al., The Divide Between Rural and Urban America, in 6 Charts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2017-03-20/6-charts-that-
illustrate-the-divide-between-rural-and-urban-america [https://perma.cc/339V-RFBG] (stating that 
rural areas experience high poverty rates, fewer new jobs, and higher rates of disabilities); Press Re-
lease, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Suicide Rates for Rural Counties Consistently Higher 
Than Urban Counties from 2001–2015 (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2017/
p1005-rural-suicide-rates.html [https://perma.cc/9QQT-XT2U]. 
 107 McGinley, supra note 23, at 373. 
 108 James Rainey, Lighting the West, Dividing a Tribe, NBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://
www.nbcnews.com/specials/navajo-coal [https://perma.cc/DSW6-V8PT]. 
 109 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVITALIZING AMERICA’S MILLS: A REPORT ON BROWNFIELDS 
MILL PROJECTS 2, 24 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/mill_
report_110306.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3AV-AE83]. 
 110 See, e.g., Margaret Carrel et al., Pigs in Space: Determining the Environmental Justice Land-
scape of Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) in Iowa, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. 
& PUB. HEALTH 849 (2016) (detailing harmful level of pollution produced by the swine industry). 
 111 See J. Paul Newell, Rural Healthcare: The Challenges of a Changing Environment, 47 MER-
CER L. REV. 979, 981 (1996) (“The 1970s were labeled a ‘rural renaissance,’ with the rate of rural 
population growth outpacing urban growth for the first time in the twentieth century. However, this 
trend was reversed in the 1980s, primarily because of the depressed rural economy.”). 
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ness foreclosures and abandonments seemed to smother a spark that was oth-
erwise fueling a path toward revitalization.112 
This Article is therefore not concerned solely with poverty—an already 
pressing problem—but also with what appears to be the large-scale, systematic 
unraveling of many rural local governments and related social and economic 
systems throughout the country. Rural decline is not necessarily a tragedy per 
se. Viewed through one lens, it makes sense for people to move to cities with 
more job opportunities; it also makes sense for obsolete or hazardous indus-
tries to be phased out.113 But approximately sixty million people still live in 
rural places; one-fifth of these sixty million are more vulnerable, non-white 
populations.114 As more young people leave rural America, and the ever-aging 
rural population’s property values continue to drop, many rural localities will 
continue to decline.115 Even if it would be too daunting or irrational to try to 
reverse these trends, the management of this decline—or the current lack 
thereof—raises important ethical questions.  
One response to these trends is that rural residents should simply relocate 
to the places that enjoy a higher proportion of resources and greater economic 
opportunity.116 Yet, this solution to rural marginalization fails for several rea-
                                                                                                                           
 112 Annie Lowrey, The Great Recession Is Still with Us, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/12/great-recession-still-with-us/547268/ [https://perma.
cc/LD4U-4ZLM]; Gillian B. White, Rural America’s Silent Housing Crisis, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/01/rural-americas-silent-housing-crisis/
384885/ [https://perma.cc/2GVN-9B74]. 
 113 See Dipak Kumar, Rural America Is Losing Young People—Consequences and Solutions, 
WHARTON SCH. U. PENN. PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 23, 2018), https://publicpolicy.wharton.
upenn.edu/live/news/2393-rural-america-is-losing-young-people- [https://perma.cc/A9YA-BGAU] 
(arguing that “economic migration supports free market allocation of labor, capital, and taxes” and 
that the ability of rural Americans to move to more urban areas has benefitted the economy and con-
tributed to growth). 
 114 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, New Census Data Show Differences Between Urban and 
Rural Populations (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-210.
html [https://perma.cc/X8XW-FS5W]; see Tieken, supra note 4 (providing data that among rural 
residents who are minorities, about forty percent are Black, thirty-five percent nonwhite Hispanic, and 
twenty-five percent Native-American, Asian, Pacific Islander, or multiracial). 
 115 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 114. 
 116 Cf. Arnold, supra note 16, at 191 (explaining that the inequitable funding for rural welfare 
programs stems from assumptions that rural residents eventually migrate to cities and that to help this 
declining, politically insignificant population would be futile anyway); Nick Gillespie, If Rural Amer-
icans Are Being ‘Left Behind,’ Why Don’t They Just Move?, REASON (Jan. 9, 2018), https://reason.
com/blog/2018/01/09/if-rural-americans-are-being-left-behind [https://perma.cc/XF42-T9HT]; Henry 
Grabar, In Defense of the Small City, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/02/small-
cities-and-rural-areas-deserve-revitalization.html [https://perma.cc/J4AQ-RECZ]; Heather Long, 
America’s Forgotten Towns: Can They Be Saved or Should People Just Leave?, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/01/02/americas-forgotten-towns-can-
they-be-saved-or-should-people-just-leave/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.03f59776dca9 [https://perma.
cc/7U4K-KJD6]. See generally ELIZABETH CATTE, WHAT YOU ARE GETTING WRONG ABOUT APPA-
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sons. First, the de facto policy in most areas to address rural decline has been 
just this approach: residents in dying or long-struggling communities have 
been left to their own devices with the hope that they will relocate to more liv-
able locales. Many have indeed moved, but many have not. Those who remain 
may be unable to move because of a lack of resources or other impediments to 
mobility.117 They may also decline to move because they do not want to. The 
high rates of rural suicides, opioid overdose deaths, and other “deaths of des-
pair” should prompt commentators to more deeply examine the impediments 
to rural mobility. 
This line of thinking also raises the question of whether it is ethically ob-
jectionable to mandate mobility, or whether the onus is on public entities to 
provide basic services to existing communities. It is not necessarily clear that 
life would be better in a large urban center, where housing costs, long com-
mutes, and a loss of community may bring a qualitatively different form of 
suffering upon relocation.118 The “just move” argument also presumes that 
there will always be a perfect match of opportunities available to those who 
would seek them, only potentially in a different place. This presumption seems 
faulty, especially as we move into a future that will increasingly displace 
workers through automation.119 
Finally, as this analysis illustrates, the “just move” argument also ignores 
the structural forces that have shaped the modern rural status quo. It is not the 
case that well-informed individuals en masse decided to locate themselves in 
an unfortunate locale and can simply undo the decision. Rural communities 
have often been crafted over the course of decades in order to create a work-
force to provide public necessities. The presumption of perfect individual au-
tonomy seems questionable; many people were born where they are, and after 
multiple generations became reliant on a local mono-economy that was formed 
on the basis of public subsidies and other policy drivers.120 In other words, to-
                                                                                                                           
LACHIA (2018) (describing the author’s personal experience of having many people ask her why more 
Appalachians do not simply leave Appalachia, in light of difficult living conditions). 
 117 See Schleicher, supra note 2, at 78 (discussing reasons why poor Americans find it difficult to 
relocate to areas with more employment opportunities, and labeling Americans in the twenty-first 
century as “homebodies”). 
 118 Cf. Patrick Sisson, The Housing Crisis Isn’t Just About Affordability—It’s About Economic 
Mobility, Too, CURBED (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/4/24/17275068/jobs-mobility-
high-rent-housing-costs [https://perma.cc/9SP7-B4GH] (discussing the prohibitively high cost of 
housing in California and land-use restrictions that discourage migration from rural areas to urban 
areas). 
 119 See Leigh C. Anderson, Automation Is Coming for More Jobs Than You May Realize, SALON 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/11/29/automation-is-coming-for-more-jobs-than-you-
may-realize/ [https://perma.cc/XNS8-DSWE]. 
 120 Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 302–04 (discussing the public role in creating communities de-
pendent upon fossil fuels); Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 13–14 (discussing the role of the 
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day’s rural marginalization was not created by each individual’s faulty choices, 
but by society as a whole. As such, the allocation of resources that shapes rural 
inequity is worthy of everyone’s attention.121 
D. “Rural” as an Intersectional Concept 
Some may still be skeptical as to whether rurality is a meaningful lens for 
understanding these forms of inequity. First, other factors, such as race, have a 
causal relationship with poverty and exposure to environmental hazards; in-
deed, white rural residents may well be among the populations exploiting rural 
residents of color.122 Second, urban communities also face challenges like 
those described above, which may suggest that the rural plight is not unique, 
but a part of broader societal trends in inequality. 
This Article readily acknowledges that rurality is not always the most im-
portant factor. Both enslaved people and plantation owners were once “rural,” 
and it was not their rurality that shaped their power relations. Yet, rurality war-
rants attention for several reasons.123 One reason is the nature of rurality it-
self.124 Rural residents, by definition, live outside large population centers. 
This fact alone carries a host of realities. Land is a more dominant part of life, 
and as such, land uses may have more direct and potent relationships with 
people’s lives, livelihoods, and welfare.125 The scarcer population renders local 
governments weaker and people enjoy fewer protections by way of land use 
                                                                                                                           
New Deal and Farm Bill in shaping the development of agricultural communities); Hardy, supra note 
41 (noting that economic policies affect how economic growth is distributed and that the twenty-first 
century has seen “systematic defunding” of rural communities). 
 121 Cf. Lichter & Brown, supra note 46, at 1 (arguing that all Americans should be concerned 
about the plight of rural America, not least because of rural America’s important role in providing 
foodstuffs, natural resources, and recreational opportunities for the rest of the country). 
 122 See, e.g., Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 3, at 15–17 (discussing the role of white farmers and 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture in driving black farmers off their land throughout the twentieth 
century, contributing to a ninety percent drop in black farmers between 1920 and 1970—from 925,000 
to fewer than 10,000). 
 123 Cf. Lichter & Brown, supra note 46, at 1 (explaining that “rural and urban are ‘complementary 
parts’ of a nation’s settlement system, and ‘familiarity with only one of them limits understanding of 
the whole’” (quoting Peter Schaeffer et al., Urban and Rural: Opportunities No More!, 28 ECON. 
DEV. Q. 1, 3–4 (2014))).  
 124 See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Politics of the Rural Vote, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 743, 746 (2003) (dis-
cussing how “rural dwellers are tied together by virtue of living in rural areas, and common issues 
exist for those residing in the most isolated—the most rural—of rural areas, including unifying themes 
of isolation, poverty, and lack of access to goods and services”). 
 125 Cf. SAFFORD ET AL., supra note 91, at 7 (observing that because “rural communities are close-
ly tied to nature,” research needs to investigate rural residents’ views of environmental problems and 
related attitudes about development opportunities); Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 204. 
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planning and zoning ordinances.126 The lack of development makes economic 
opportunities scarcer, driving more people to engage in hazardous or undesira-
ble economic activity to survive.127 The distance from population centers 
brings with it invisibility, a veil between rural residents and a mainstream pop-
ulation that may be either ignorant or indifferent to abuses that take place out-
side of cities.128 
But some trends permeate rural communities nationwide, in addition to 
consistent qualitative themes concerning land, scarcity, invisibility, and law’s 
more limited reach into daily life.129 The vast majority of persistent poverty 
counties are located in rural areas.130 Rural communities as a whole have also 
lost population and have seen residents’ sources of income change in recent 
decades.131 Studies that control for various factors, including place, have 
demonstrated as much, in addition to observations of large-scale trends.132 As 
with other characteristics, place interacts with factors such as race, class, and 
gender to shape a person or community’s experiences.133 Critically, “rural” is 
not synonymous with “white,” just as “urban” is not synonymous with 
“black.”134 Ultimately, the premise in this Article is that place matters in addi-
tion to the other factors that are considered relevant to marginalization. 
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uploads/RHRC_FR121_Doescher.pdf [https://perma.cc/93UY-5E84].  
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II. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE RURAL CONDITION 
This Part turns to theories of distributive justice and argues that they have 
under-examined relevance to the rural condition.135 Section A provides a broad 
overview of distributive justice theories and establishes this inquiry as a 
Rawlsian one focused on the unfairness of placing burdens on discrete groups 
for the benefit of all.136 Section B discusses the specific burdens of economic 
loss and environmental hazards, additional theoretical frameworks that empha-
size unfairness specific to those burdens, and the unique relevance of these 
particular factors to today’s conditions and the question of whether rural com-
munities have experienced injustice.137 
A. Theories of Distributive Justice 
An exploration of distributive justice and its application to the rural con-
dition today seems critical for several reasons. First, the persistence of rural 
poverty raises questions as to the distributional decisions that either shape that 
poverty or fail to address it. Second, the functional role of rural communities in 
American life and the widespread “ruralization” of economic distress raise 
questions about whether rural communities have disproportionately shouldered 
society’s burdens and losses and, if so, whether that distribution is “just.” 
Third, scholars’ and policymakers’ flummoxed response to today’s rural chal-
lenges—including socioeconomic decline, local government struggles, and 
infrastructural decay—suggests that a theoretically-grounded discussion of 
what is fair or unfair about urban and rural dynamics can help inform ap-
proaches to these problems. 
Literature on the various theories of distributive justice is vast and di-
verse; one can begin with Aristotle and spend a lifetime on the subsequent 
2,400 years of writings.138 This Section does not debate or defend the legitima-
cy of a particular subset of those ideas. Instead, it accepts certain premises as 
givens and forms a framework by which to assess potential injustices that have 
shaped rural America. 
Prominent concepts purporting to establish how resources should be allo-
cated include Rawlsianism, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, Pareto efficiency, and 
equalitarianism.139 Questions central to each of these theories include: (1) How 
should social, economic, and other benefits and burdens be distributed 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See infra notes 136–179 and accompanying text. 
 136 See infra notes 138–149 and accompanying text. 
 137 See infra notes 150–179 and accompanying text. 
 138 See generally ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS (Carnes Lord trans., U. of Chi. Press 2nd ed. 
2013) (discussing the pursuit of virtue within political communities). 
 139 Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Ap-
proach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 982 (2001). 
216 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:189 
throughout a population? (2) Is it acceptable for a minority group’s welfare to 
be reduced in the name of the aggregate welfare? (3) If the answer to the latter 
question is “yes,” what are the conditions warranting such a tradeoff? (4) If a 
group is sacrificed in the name of aggregate welfare, should there be offsetting 
benefits or compensation? And finally, (5) what institutional design will 
achieve the fairest distributions? 
Equalitarianism is the only concept that demands full equality in distribu-
tions and related socioeconomic status.140 A synthesis of the other three 
schools of thought reveals, first, the principle that policy developments are best 
if no one is made worse off. But, given that virtually all transitions or distribu-
tional decisions make someone worse off, that loss can be justified either if the 
losers are compensated or if the decision enhances the welfare of the most vul-
nerable members of society. 
This Article’s inquiry is essentially a Rawlsian one, informed by the idea 
that unfairness is inherent in “the arbitrary imposition of selective burdens on 
the few for the benefit of the many.”141 Rawls’s famous “original position” and 
“veil of ignorance” concepts address the questions above.142 He argues that we 
should design a society as if we did not know what life and characteristics we 
would be born into.143 These principles are based on the premise that we tend 
to advocate the sacrifice of a particular population in the name of the aggregate 
welfare if we do not belong to that population. But if we were part of the group 
made less well off, we would design society’s allocation of benefits and bur-
dens to ensure that the sacrificed minority were as well off as possible.144 In 
other words, according to Rawls, a certain level of minority sacrifice may be 
acceptable, but there should be adequately offsetting benefits to the most vul-
nerable members of society. 
The Rawlsian framework has unique applicability to the rural context. 
Namely, much of traditional rural life centers on productive activities that in-
crease aggregate welfare.145 This relationship does not inherently necessitate 
neglect or sacrifice; farmers and miners, for instance, could theoretically be the 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Id. at 983–84. 
 141 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of 
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 394 (2000) (discussing Professor Frank Michelman’s 
classic law review article—Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law—on when a government taking can be “just” within the Rawlsian theory 
of distributive justice (citing 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)). 
 142 See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 136–42 (discussing the concept of the “veil of ignorance”). 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. at 183–92. 
 145 See Lichter & Ziliak, supra note 58, at 8. 
2020] Distributive Justice and Rural America 217 
highest-paid workers in a society.146 Yet, in the United States, the reality of 
many rural livelihoods has been hard work, hazardous conditions, long hours, 
uncertain rewards, and limited reciprocal benefits.147 Distributive justice ques-
tions arise at the most fundamental level of urban-rural relations. These rela-
tions have raised even more urgent distributive justice questions as traditional 
rural livelihoods have been phased out, with that decline itself rationalized in 
the name of collective progress. 
In applying the broad theoretical questions posed above, distributive jus-
tice inquiries may ask two more specific questions: (1) What are the actual dis-
tributions of benefits and burdens among groups, and are they justified? (2) 
Are the procedures or political processes that determined those allocations 
fair?148 This Article focuses more on the former question to make the case that 
chronic rural poverty is linked to distributive injustice, and the latter question 
to make the case that rural communities in decline have experienced distribu-
tive injustice. But, as will be shown in Part III, the treatment of rural communi-
ties seems likely to fail any of these tests.149 Rural populations of color are 
among the most vulnerable communities in the country, yet modern distribu-
tional decisions consistently fail to improve their quality of life. The alienation 
expressed by rural communities in decline, in addition to the regional decay 
they are experiencing, suggests that losses associated with rural decline—
which Part III will show cannot be blithely dismissed as a market-based phe-
nomenon—remain uncompensated. 
B. The Burdens of Economic Loss and Environmental Hazards 
To further illuminate the circumstances affecting communities in decline, 
the analysis below narrows its focus to emphasize two specific forms of bur-
den: economic losses and environmental hazards. The discussion draws on the 
concept of the “just transition” to characterize inordinate economic losses that 
have been imposed on rural communities in decline.150 The idea of just transi-
                                                                                                                           
 146 See, e.g., Eric Bellman, With Cash Handouts, India Takes Step Toward Universal Basic In-
come, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/with-cash-handouts-india-takes-step-
toward-universal-basic-income-11549020444 [https://perma.cc/2CNM-E54Q] (discussing govern-
ment measures in India that are moving the country toward providing universal basic income for small 
farmers). 
 147 See Shannon Elizabeth Bell & Richard York, Community Economic Identity: The Coal Indus-
try and Ideology Construction in West Virginia, 75 RURAL SOC. 111, 112 (2010); David L. Hard & 
John R. Myers, Fatal Work-Related Injuries in the Agriculture Production Sector Among Youth in the 
United States, 1992–2002, 11 J. AGROMEDICINE 57, 58 (2006); Pruitt, supra note 41, at 169–70. 
 148 Kaswan, supra note 18, at 1047, 1062. 
 149 See infra notes 180–320 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Daniels et al., supra note 37, at 6–7 (discussing “economic externalities that society’s 
pursuit of environmental protection imposes on the poor and vulnerable” and arguing that “without 
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tions has grown increasingly popular in the face of efforts to decarbonize the 
economy. The term first emerged in union advocacy in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury when curtailments on hazardous industrial activity began to displace 
workers in those industries.151 The idea was that workers alone should not bear 
their economic loss if society is to benefit from policies that result in them los-
ing their livelihoods. Rather, the loss should be distributed equitably among 
everyone. 
Although the concept of a just transition has not been widely recognized 
as a principle of distributive justice, the concentration of economic losses on 
rural communities signals its theoretical relevance. Many today are discussing 
just transitions in a forward-looking sense, asking what measures can be taken 
to ensure a fair distribution of losses in the transition to clean energy. For in-
stance, as scientists and economists have acknowledged that effective reduc-
tions in carbon emissions will displace workers in the fossil fuel sector, com-
mentators have recognized the need for measures to ensure that the economic 
losses associated with this transition are not unfairly concentrated on fossil fuel 
workers and communities.152 
Yet, few have applied this lens to the past, asking which workers and 
communities have already borne disproportionate losses in the name of the 
greater good. Demands for just transitions equate to demands for the equitable 
distribution of economic losses.153 These demands suggest that it is worthwhile 
to ask whether past transitions could be deemed unjust, and what consequences 
flow from “unjust transitions.” 
The concept of a just transition raises questions that relate directly to a 
society’s design and the distributive theories discussed above. Legal and eco-
nomic transitions are necessary for society to evolve.154 Legislatures must, it is 
presumed, be able to regulate without necessarily creating offsetting benefits 
for anyone who stands to lose in some way as a result of the regulation.155 This 
concern is a central focus of discussions on the causes of these losses: most are 
comfortable compensating or mitigating losses to communities if those losses 
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justice for rural America will be unattainable). 
 151 LES LEOPOLD, THE MAN WHO HATED WORK AND LOVED LABOR 468 (2007). 
 152 Robert Pollin & Brian Callaci, A Just Transition for U.S. Fossil Fuel Industry Workers, AM. 
PROSPECT (July 6, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/just-transition-us-fossil-fuel-industry-workers 
[https://perma.cc/6F8H-DWGT]. 
 153 See David J. Doorey, A Law of Just Transitions? Putting Labour Law to Work on Climate 
Change, 12 OSGOODE LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, no. 35, 2016, at 1, 2, 9; Eisenberg, supra note 
24, at 278.  
 154 Doremus, supra note 31, at 3. 
 155 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (explaining that “[g]overnment hardly 
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for 
every such change in the general law”). 
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are clearly a result of public action.156 This acceptance arises most notably in 
the takings context where compensation is constitutionally required.157 Em-
ployment losses may also evoke such sympathy if public causation is clear. But 
mitigating losses associated with “economic transitions” strike commentators 
as less worthy of attention—even though differentiating legal and economic 
transitions in our society seems virtually impossible.158 In short, laissez-faire 
ideologies in the United States suggest that we should err on the side of having 
workers bear their own losses, and only in rare cases and under certain condi-
tions have society as a whole attempt to shoulder those losses collectively.159 
This stance raises the question of what is to be made of rural America. 
Declining rural communities are a living (or dying) example of the logical ex-
treme of asking communities and workers to shoulder concentrated burdens of 
economic losses. Although the trade adjustment programs discussed below 
appear to have attempted to offset some rural losses, rural conditions today 
suggest such measures were mere drops in the bucket. To deny that this exper-
iment has been a failure is to deny the existence of literal widespread death and 
despair outside the country’s major urban centers, as well as the political and 
cultural alienation that has percolated in rural places for decades.160 
The theoretical concerns outlined here, such as the repugnancy of minori-
ty sacrifice in the name of aggregate welfare, suggest that just transitions are a 
principle of distributive justice worth deeper contemplation. As with other 
models of distributive justice, just transitions have a substantive and a proce-
dural component. A transition is substantively “unjust” if workers in a particu-
lar sector alone bear the costs of societal evolution beyond a hazardous or ob-
solete industry.161 The procedural path toward a just transition involves more 
meaningful avenues for input by affected groups in order for them to have a 
chance to ensure better outcomes for themselves.162 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Cf. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 513–14 
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 158 See Kaplow, supra note 156, at 534 (“[T]here is little to distinguish losses arising from gov-
ernment and market risk.”). 
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In an era of rapid, ongoing transitions and increasing inequality, the con-
cept’s relevance will continue to be implicated. Yet, more pragmatically, an 
embrace of the just transition concept may enhance political stability and re-
duce polarization more than current neoliberal policies. Ample literature con-
nects rural economic marginalization with widespread anti-government senti-
ment.163 It is worth contemplating whether the failure to ensure just transitions 
over the past several decades has contributed to this alienation. The past failure 
to ensure just transitions also raises the question of what risks, both ethical and 
practical, may be run in the future by allowing economic losses to be concen-
trated on other discrete populations.164 
The subsequent discussion also focuses on the specific burden of envi-
ronmental hazards in declining rural communities. Environmental justice theo-
ry focuses in part on fairness in society’s distributions of environmental haz-
ards or benefits. This framework, too, illuminates modern rural conditions. 
Primarily, it is the environmental context where utilitarian thinking about rural 
places seems the most tempting. Because rural places have fewer people and 
more space, it seems almost natural that land uses such as shale gas extraction, 
nuclear waste storage, and wind farm installations are destined to be borne by 
rural communities, when we would be loath to allow them in cities, or when 
doing so would be impracticable.165 Rural environmental injustice has also 
received little academic and public attention. Because of widespread rural en-
vironmental hazards that have been pursued in the name of the greater good, it 
seems worth exploring relationships between rural communities and society’s 
environmental benefits and burdens. 
Rural environmental injustice has tended to be at the periphery of envi-
ronmental justice conversations.166 This oversight stems in part from a focus 
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on race and class in rural environmental justice scenarios.167 Meanwhile, “the 
spatial relationships and tensions between urban and rural communities” have 
not been sufficiently studied or emphasized.168 The limited legal literature on 
rural environmental injustice in the United States has tended to focus either on 
farmworkers or on natural resource extraction and energy production.169 A re-
cent discourse among rural sociologists takes a broader view, characterizing 
the urban majority’s treatment of the rural as its “dumping ground.”170 
One reason for the limited attention to rural environmental injustice may 
be the tacit belief that rural environmental injustice is somehow more “natural” 
than environmental injustice elsewhere; in most minds, siting hazardous land 
uses in rural places probably makes sense.171 Rural places have more space and 
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 170 See Ashwood & MacTavish, supra note 167, at 274. 
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fewer people. The hazards have to go somewhere. And rural communities have 
often neither regulated nor resisted hazardous land uses in their environs.172  
But if utilitarian reasoning—that minority sacrifice is justified by a con-
comitant increase in aggregate welfare—is generally considered ethically re-
pugnant, why do so many embrace this form of reasoning when it concerns the 
utilization of rural land and people?173 
The first reason is likely a belief that rural land uses reflect community 
preferences.174 But it is not clear that rural communities have always acqui-
esced to environmental hazards, despite what coal miners featured in the media 
might lead the public to believe. Many rural communities have vocally pro-
tested hazardous industrial activities or even attempted to outlaw them—as has 
been the case with natural resource extraction, hazardous waste storage, and 
agribusiness throughout the country—only to have those activities imposed 
nonetheless.175 
Indeed, the scarcity of land use regulations in rural communities does not 
necessarily reflect a lack of concern for how land is used. It can also reflect a 
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despite support for mining from federal, state, and local governments). 
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lack of capacity to adopt the local legal regimes that more populated and so-
phisticated communities use to protect themselves. Some would-be polluters 
engage in strategic searches for those places where people are the least 
equipped to protect themselves.176 Because many rural residents are governed by 
sparsely populated, poorly equipped counties rather than municipalities with 
frameworks such as zoning ordinances, rural residents may be all the more vul-
nerable to these predatory practices.177 These communities’ smaller popula-
tions also put them at a disadvantage when it comes to garnering the public 
attention needed to successfully prevent undesired land uses. 
Even if a utilitarian argument in favor of causing the least harm to the 
fewest people supports the prospect of placing environmental hazards into ru-
ral communities, the question of procedural justice still remains.178 If rural 
communities were better equipped to participate in the political process and 
voice their opposition, would the substantive inequity still be imposed upon 
them based on this utilitarian rationale? 
Finally, another question warranting contemplation is whether the recent 
proliferation of rural blight is an environmental justice issue. As population 
migration and the urbanization trends continue, remaining rural residents are 
increasingly saddled with the costs of empty and decaying built infrastructure. 
Rural population outmigration has largely resulted from measures pursued in 
the name of aggregate welfare, such as liberalized international trade. Leaving 
those residents to handle this widespread problem on their own seems like yet 
another burden concentrated on a discrete population despite the majority’s 
role in creating it. 
In sum, rural environmental injustice has generally been overlooked. Yet 
the environmental justice framework has unique applicability to the rural con-
text in light of the collective temptation to justify locating environmental haz-
ards in rural places, as well as traditional rural livelihoods’ closer connections 
to land-based industrial activity. It may be tempting to dismiss rural environ-
mental injustice as more “natural” or the lesser of two evils when compared to 
other forms of environmental injustice. But rationalizing rural environmental 
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injustice based on aggregate welfare raises the same distributive justice con-
cerns as environmental injustice elsewhere. Perhaps the most fundamental 
question is whether this form of utilitarianism is recognized for what it is—a 
sacrifice of a population “for the greater good,” raising important normative 
questions of justice. 
Combining economic losses and environmental hazards into their own 
distributive justice framework paints a potent picture of “what happened in 
rural America.” By highlighting both economic losses and environmental bur-
dens, this framework illuminates important contours of today’s urban-rural 
divisions. Many rural communities spent the industrial era caught in a catch-
22: local employers polluted with impunity, but they were the only source of 
economic activity.179 When the hazardous industries left—as many have in 
recent decades—their disappearance did not offer relief, but only a qualitative-
ly different struggle. Declining rural communities today have thus been left 
with neither the pristine rural environment of our collective imagination, nor 
the once-storied industrial spirit of the American small town. These losses and 
burdens shape the modern rural condition for many communities in decline. 
III. A DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF THE LAW’S  
TREATMENT OF RURAL LIVELIHOODS 
This Part applies the framework discussed above in a critique of the law’s 
treatment of rural livelihoods for the past several decades.180 Section A dis-
cusses actual distributions of resources to rural communities and argues that 
these distributions raise fairness concerns.181 Section B applies a distributive 
justice lens to legal developments in three major sectors of the rural econo-
my.182 Subsection 1 of Section B critiques the recent evolution of legal regimes 
shaping the agricultural sector;183 Subsection 2 does the same for extractive 
industries;184 and Subsection 3 focuses on manufacturing.185 
A. Inequitable Allocations of Resources as Distributive Injustice 
Inequitable distributions of resources to rural communities arise across a 
variety of resource types. These range from direct spending to infrastructure 
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development to access to services that may be private, but are nonetheless nec-
essary. Quantifying all of the resource distributions between urban and rural 
communities is, of course, difficult to do. Nonetheless, literature and data ex-
amining different sectors appear to reveal a pattern of rural communities, as a 
whole, being underserved by public, quasi-public, and private providers. 
Limited access to broadband internet has perhaps received the most atten-
tion of late as an issue of rural communities being unfairly left behind. As of 
2019, twenty-six percent of Americans living in rural areas and thirty-two per-
cent of Americans living in Tribal lands lacked access to the Federal Commu-
nications Commission’s minimum standard of broadband coverage; only 1.7% 
of Americans living in urban areas lacked such coverage.186 Concerns of ineq-
uitable access arise with even more basic needs. Rural schools are dispropor-
tionately underfunded.187 A 2018 report on energy poverty argued that rural 
residents’ relatively higher household burden of energy costs “is not a story 
about high energy prices,” but one illustrating “historic inequities in the de-
ployment of energy infrastructure” disadvantaging rural households.188 Com-
pared to their urban counterparts, rural residents received less than fifty per-
cent the rate of annual per capita federal spending from 1994 to 2001 in gen-
eral.189 Ample literature establishes a gaping disparity between urban and rural 
access to doctors and lawyers.190 More money is available through private phi-
lanthropy in urban areas than in rural areas as well.191 State-specific studies 
have shown that these and other inequities persist throughout the country.192 
Conditions are particularly egregious on Native-American reservations, which 
are mostly rural and governed closely by federal agencies; a 2003 report from 
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the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found significant disparities between 
funding for tribal needs versus funding for other groups.193 
Some would argue that it is only natural that access to these resources 
would be more limited in rural areas. Measures to diffuse virtually any form of 
service or development are more expensive per capita outside cities due to the 
need to travel longer distances and serve more dispersed populations. For pub-
lic services, reaching rural communities will strain public coffers, whereas for 
private services, providers stand to gain more limited profits. 
Although it is true that a less dense population separated by more distance 
may be more costly and difficult to serve, the mere idea that rural life is ineffi-
cient stymies efforts to even attempt to serve rural communities adequately.194   
These trends raise fundamental questions about the obligation of local, 
state, and federal governments to protect those who reside within their bounda-
ries, as well as whether these resource allocations can be deemed “unjust.”195 
In the public sector, it seems difficult to justify not striving harder to meet 
basic rural needs. Although few would argue that it would be unjust for a pri-
vate service provider like a doctor to decline to locate in a rural area, policy-
makers’ failure to enact programs to promote equitable access to necessary 
private services seems just as concerning as disproportionately low public ex-
penditures. 
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Defenders of the status quo will raise two additional arguments to justify 
the inequities present in rural Americans’ everyday life. First, rural residents—
the majority of whom are white and (if they vote) conservative—are unlikely 
to demand better access to resources through the political process; sociologist 
Arlie Hochschild calls poor rural whites’ tendency to vote against expanded 
public services “the great paradox.”196 Second, rural residents in fact benefit 
from disproportionately high resources in other contexts. Some note, for in-
stance, that rural regions receive more than they contribute to state and federal 
coffers.197 
The first argument raises a variety of questions, but ultimately fails be-
cause it is not clear that election outcomes are the only factor that should de-
cide the fate of a region. Perhaps most concerning, these inequitable resource 
allocations fall harder on chronically poor rural communities, which are dis-
proportionately people of color who tend to vote for Democrats.198 Thus, ma-
joritarian mandates cannot be the only measure by which to decide whether 
communities need or deserve help. As to the second argument—that rural 
communities benefit disproportionately from other resources—they do, in 
some contexts.199 But those resources are almost overwhelmingly designed to 
benefit poor people; rural communities benefit disproportionately, for instance, 
from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and unemployment 
benefits.200 In contrast, the resources that rural residents are denied—such as 
infrastructure, broadband, and education—tend to be capacity-building re-
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sources that can spur economic growth and reduce regional dependency on 
direct aid. One must at least ask whether better distributional decisions for de-
pendency-reducing measures might help reduce distributions of resources 
geared toward alleviating crises. 
Although some characteristics of rural communities may naturally make 
them more difficult or costly to serve, policy decisions concerning rural places 
are nonetheless infused with value judgments and choices as to which commu-
nities merit service and to what extent. In other words, it should not be pre-
sumed that rural communities are naturally fated to poverty and struggle.201 
Despite the importance of rural activities to society as a whole, available data 
on distributions of resources to rural places in the United States bear out the 
idea that they do not enjoy an equitable allocation of critical resources.202 
These inequities alone raise questions of distributive justice. 
Ultimately, it remains unclear how the distributional disparities discussed 
here can be justified, looking back to the frameworks of justice described 
above. Some of the country’s most vulnerable residents live in these under-
served areas. It also seems unlikely that their limited access to these resources 
is somehow offset or compensated by decisions to direct them elsewhere. 
B. Majoritarian-Utilitarian Sacrifice as Distributive Injustice 
This Section provides a distributive justice critique of the law and policy 
frameworks shaping three key economic sectors that once helped sustain rural 
life: agriculture,203 natural resource extraction,204 and manufacturing.205 For 
each sector, the discussion highlights (1) major legal developments of the past 
several decades; (2) how those legal developments imposed or overlooked 
concentrated economic losses and environmental hazards that burdened rural 
people and places; and (3) how these policies that undermined rural welfare 
were rationalized by service to “the greater good,” yet did not result in gains for 
society’s most vulnerable or offsetting measures for the communities affected. 
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This Section therefore demonstrates how utilitarian thought embodied in deci-
sion-making processes effectuated a grand sacrifice of rural communities.206 
1. Agriculture 
Agricultural life in the United States has never been easy. In the 1930s, 
when farmers accounted for two-thirds of the rural population, high rates of 
farm poverty were a problem nationwide, inspiring the first federal interven-
tions into rural poverty.207 By the 1960s, farmers made up approximately one-
quarter of the rural population and rural poverty was an issue examined in both 
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farm and non-farm contexts.208 Today, farmers—most of whom also earn non-
farm income—make up less than five percent of the rural population and are 
not the main object of poverty-related concern.209 Farmworkers, by contrast, 
face high rates of poverty, difficult working conditions, and other forms of 
vulnerability. 
Even if the traditional small farm was not the romanticized version seen 
on television, commentators focusing on the nexus of the evolution of the agri-
cultural sector and community economic development tend to agree on one 
thing: farm consolidation from the mid-twentieth century to the present was 
not a positive development for farming communities as a whole.210  
The 1930s saw the creation of the foundation for modern agricultural pol-
icy. The 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act (the first “Farm Bill”), though 
sometimes understood as providing aid to the poor or small farmers, in fact 
started the wheels turning toward dramatic farm consolidation over the next 
ninety years—tilting the scale in favor of large agribusiness.211 The Farm Bill 
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has been renewed every five years since its enactment in 1933.212 Although 
initially intended as a modest intervention into crop markets, the Farm Bill is 
entangled with nearly all aspects of rural community development. For years, 
critics have argued that the Farm Bill serves to “subsidize the expansion of a 
mega-farm that puts family farmers out of business.”213 Even in early Farm 
Bills, “farmers, tenants, and sharecroppers were ‘shoved aside in the rush to-
ward bigger units, more tractors, and less men per acre,’” reducing the number 
of farmers (both white and black) by approximately one-third by 1945.214 By 
1970, ninety percent of black farmers, who had primarily been located in the 
South, were forced out of their agricultural livelihoods and driven northward in 
the Great Migration because the U.S. Department of Agriculture facilitated 
farm consolidation, mechanization, and various forms of discrimination, such 
as withholding loans.215 
Moving forward in history, commentators often point to President Nix-
on’s Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, as the champion of modern farm con-
solidation, agricultural industrialization, and the high-volume cultivation of 
monoculture cash crops.216 Others point out, though, that the programs associ-
ated with Butz—such as cutting production controls for corn or weakening 
supply management that helped control commodity prices and support farm 
livelihoods—in fact predate his time in office.217 In any case, the 1970s saw 
continued federal support for agricultural industrialization and consolidation, 
which arguably became more mainstream during that era. 
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Most agree that the 1980s farm crisis represented a substantial turning 
point in the evolution of modern agriculture. But little modern discussion con-
templates the role of the 1980s farm crisis in shaping today’s rural conditions. 
This short collective memory masks one of the ongoing contributors to the ur-
ban-rural divide; institutions’ manipulation of the farming sector in the 1980s 
left deep wounds that have not healed. First, in the 1970s, the Department of 
Agriculture, bankers, and university extension offices told farmers that they 
must either “get big or get out.”218 Because the rate of inflation was running 
higher than interest rates, institutional lenders, including government lenders 
like the Farm Home Administration (FmHA), told farmers to borrow as much 
as possible to invest in farmland.219 
By the 1980s, though, the bubble had burst. The Federal Reserve abruptly 
reversed course on its lending practices and dictated high interest rates on 
loans that the average small farmer simply could not repay.220 This might not 
have destroyed so many small farms on its own, but coupled with reduced crop 
subsidies and increased competition from multinational food monopolies’ 
domination of markets, small farmers were no longer positioned to survive.221 
The fallout from the farm crisis was devastating and widespread. During 
the worst period in 1986–1987, almost one million Americans were displaced 
from their farms.222 Years before and after that peak saw between 500,000 and 
600,000 farm foreclosures.223 And many of those farmers were unable or un-
willing to “just move” to find new employment. From 1981 to 1988, “more 
farmers died from suicide than from any other unnatural cause.”224 Rates of 
alcoholism and domestic abuse also rose dramatically. Despite the increase in 
mental health issues among farmers spurred on by the farm crisis, provisions 
for rural mental health services decreased during the same period.225 
The farm crisis—which many rural residents blamed on public institu-
tions such as the FmHA—reshaped middle-class rural communities, whose 
requests for federal help went unheeded.226 In 1979, five percent of rural coun-
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ties had an unemployment rate over nine percent.227 In a mere five years that 
rate ballooned: fifty percent of rural counties had unemployment rates exceed-
ing nine percent.228 The decline of the rural farm town proceeded alongside the 
rise of the rural place as the staging site for industrialized agriculture. The 
number of farms in the United States dropped by two-thirds between 1935 and 
2012, while the average farm size more than doubled.229 Thus, over the course 
of modern history, public institutions facilitated the destruction of this longstand-
ing way of life. Some commentators have proposed that this era planted the 
seeds for anti-government militia movements among rural Americans.230 
States have also facilitated the rise of industrialized, consolidated agricul-
ture. Somewhat less dramatically, the proliferation of state right-to-farm laws 
over the past several decades has also contributed to the dominance of agri-
businesses over small farms and farming communities. Right-to-farm laws 
limit nuisance suits involving agriculture.231 Initially, the laws’ stated rationale 
was to preserve farmland. To do so, they raised evidentiary burdens for bring-
ing nuisance actions against farmers. Specifically, “many of the laws adopted a 
‘coming to the nuisance’ concept whereby activities that were not a nuisance 
when commenced would not become a nuisance due to the changed land uses 
of neighbors.”232 Yet, since their inception, observers have expressed concern 
that right-to-farm laws “provide too much protection for agricultural pursuits 
and other activities at the expense of neighboring property owners.”233 Thus, 
right-to-farm laws have served as a legal shield of sorts for industrial agriculture. 
Although industrial agriculture may not be undesirable per se, the indus-
try’s relationship with rural communities is problematic. Small, family-run 
farms are often economically challenging to run, and are far from immune 
from ethical concerns such as poor conditions for farmworkers. Nonetheless, 
they are likelier to have more symbiotic relationships within communities.234 
The presence of more farms run by more varied farmers provides more work 
opportunities, affords farmers more independence, supports families that have 
children in schools, and generally benefits the socioeconomic health of a 
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community.235 In other words, the relationship between small farms and com-
munities is symbiotic: each feeds the other. 
Large agribusiness operations, by contrast—almost all of which are 
owned by white men—have a more parasitic relationship.236 They bring with 
them a “tide [of] adverse social, economic, and environmental impacts” that 
reduce the small farmer’s ability to compete. Eventually, the presence of agri-
business in a rural community has the effect of “replacing the independent 
farmer with disempowered sharecroppers and destroys the social fabric of 
towns.”237 As corporate landowners consolidate land, they also reduce the 
number of decisionmakers contributing to community development, suffocat-
ing local autonomy. 
Many will defend the rise of industrialized agriculture as necessary to 
“scale” agricultural production due to the supposed inefficiency of the small 
farm. But this theory confuses the chicken and the egg; it assumes that small 
farms have died off because they cannot compete in the “market,” when in 
fact, publicly-provided capital, subsidies, and technological incentives have 
heavily tilted the scale in favor of industrialized agriculture.238 
Returning to principles of distributive justice, the transformation of agri-
culture discussed here illustrates several points. First, this transformation looks 
like an “unjust transition.” Farm families throughout the twentieth century—
especially farmers of color, but also the vast majority of white farmers—bore a 
substantial and disproportionate economic loss compared to the rest of society. 
Governmental policies drove them off their land and out of the countryside in 
the name of industrialized agriculture. Certainly, some people willingly moved 
to cities for a better life—and some of these trends can be attributed to “the 
market.” But for the most part, agricultural policy has been detrimental to rural 
communities as a whole. The “unjust transition” in the agricultural sector has 
been legal institutions’ role in redistributing the wealth and land of small farm-
ers to large agribusinesses—justified in the name of cheaper food for all that 
can supposedly “feed the world.”239 
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The transformation of agriculture has also imposed environmental haz-
ards on the populations that remain in declining and hollowed-out farm com-
munities. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) have received 
substantial attention in this context.240 Most animals produced for human con-
sumption are now raised in CAFOs. The animals live out their brief lives at 
high densities in indoor stalls until they are taken to other facilities for slaugh-
ter.241 CAFO advocates insist that they are an “efficient” means of pursuing 
animal agriculture. But CAFO operations also pollute the air and water and 
expose neighboring residents to severe public health risks.242 
Both the sacrifice of the rural farm to consolidated agriculture (an eco-
nomic loss borne inequitably by rural communities) and the sacrifice of the 
rural community to ongoing agribusiness pollution (an environmental burden 
borne only by rural communities) have been justified in the name of collective 
progress and efficiency. Agribusiness’s proponents justify it in the name of 
modernization and “feeding the world.”243 Although more recent critiques have 
established the disingenuousness and failed track record of food-abundance 
rationales, public institutions have embraced them while also failing to address 
the associated challenges for rural communities. Thus, the law’s role in shap-
ing the agricultural sector has facilitated the sacrifice of rural communities in 
the name of the aggregate welfare through concentrated economic losses and 
environmental burdens. 
2. Extractive Industries 
Natural resource extraction was historically another major source of eco-
nomic activity for rural communities. In recent decades, this sector has con-
tracted, contributing to a downward spiral for communities that depended on 
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it.244 Thus, an understanding of modern rural decline and related unfairness 
requires an examination of rural communities’ relationships with extractive 
industries and how the law has shaped those relationships. Although extractive 
industries are diverse—including industries such as forestry, fishing, natural 
gas and oil drilling, and gold mining—coal miners are often held out as the 
face of the so-called “urban-rural divide.”245 This Subsection focuses on coal 
in Appalachia.246 The Appalachian experience may be unique in some ways, 
but it illustrates a perfect storm of environmental justice and just transitions 
issues. The issues seen in Appalachia are also reflected in other rural commu-
nities, including coal communities elsewhere and rural communities reliant on 
other extractive industries.247 
The failure of the state and federal legal apparatus to prevent or remedy 
Appalachian problems, and the many benefits the country has reaped from Ap-
palachian exploitation, speak to the burdens Appalachia has borne in the name 
of aggregate welfare. In his book Ramp Hollow, historian Steven Stoll argues 
that the subjugation of Appalachia was neither an accident nor an unfortunate 
tragedy along the way to industrialization.248 He characterizes the nineteenth-
century “scramble for Appalachia” as embedded in “the idea that historical 
progress required taking land away from agrarians and giving it to others.”249 
Residents of Appalachia in the nineteenth century were mostly subsist-
ence farmers, but many did not own the land they used for survival. Politicians 
living in the North and East owned the titles to large stretches of Appalachian 
land, and for a time turned a blind eye to the tens of thousands of squatters that 
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claimed adverse possession to subsections of those many acres.250 Motivated 
by a burgeoning anti-“mountain people” sentiment, however, and supported by 
the courts, elite title-holders were mostly able to evict residents from the land 
on which the residents had built homes, cultivated farms, and formed commu-
nities.251 
Appalachians have since experienced a consistent history of limited ac-
cess to ownership interests in the land they worked and lived on or near.252 
Even this early evolution bore environmental justice implications, as regional 
residents had already lost autonomy and the prospect of self-determination.253 
Some commentators continue to point to Appalachia’s geographic isolation as 
an explanation for its persistent regional poverty.254 But this isolation narrative 
discounts other key factors that have shaped Appalachian poverty, namely, this 
initial land dispossession and the subsequent arrival of the extractive industry.255 
Those regional residents who were able to acquire land remained vulner-
able to the loss of another form of property: mineral rights. The agents of nine-
teenth-century speculators in natural resources were “men of great guile and 
charm” who would take advantage of regional residents’ limited literacy and 
access to information.256 Due to this unequal bargaining power, regional resi-
dents’ interests in their timber and minerals “were virtually given away.”257 
With so much land and so many minerals owned by powerful out-of-state ac-
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tors, the stage was thus set by the mid-nineteenth century for a corporate take-
over of Appalachia.258 
Appalachian coal mining began in earnest in the nineteenth century. In 
turn, the state and federal legal apparatus served to funnel local residents into 
the coal labor machine, to give the coal industry a mandate to pollute freely, 
and to deprive local residents of opportunities for redress.259 The Battle of 
Blair Mountain in 1921 was a turning point in the evolution of Appalachian 
society. Coal miners, growing intolerant of inhumane working and living con-
ditions, rose up against mine operators when their efforts to unionize were 
suppressed. After federal troops intervened, the miners alone were tried, and 
organized labor in the coalfields suffered a long-lasting blow.260 
In more recent history, Pat McGinley highlights how the Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) involved a “broken promise” 
to protect coalfield communities.261 Before the act, unregulated mining prac-
tices exacted significant environmental harms in Appalachia.262 During those 
years, mining states engaged in a race to the bottom. Although some attribute 
this to the legislatures’ desire to remain competitive through lax regulatory 
oversight, states such as West Virginia seemed generally beholden to industrial 
interests.263 Public outcry in the 1960s reached “a crescendo.” The SMCRA 
introduced a set of federal regulations designed to address problems associated 
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with mining, and also created the Office of Surface Mining.264 The SMCRA 
reduced the disastrous effects of mining pre-1977, but not enough, even today, 
to fully mitigate the adverse environmental, economic, and social impacts the 
industry has imposed on coalfield communities.265 
Another prominent example of policymakers’ failure to address Appalachi-
an environmental injustice is the law’s treatment of black lung. According to 
relatively recent investigative reports, black lung—a preventable but often fatal 
disease that afflicts coal miners—has seen a resurgence among coal miners.266 
Reporters argued that both the coal industry and federal oversight of safety regu-
lations failed to protect miners from the coal dust that causes black lung.267 De-
spite this failure, the federal government has approved a mere 7.6% of miners’ 
applications for black lung benefits.268 
U.S. society benefited from the sacrifice of Appalachia’s land and people, 
and coal production has often been lauded for its collective benefits. The 
American industrial revolution was powered by coal from West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and Kentucky; coal-fired power accounted for virtually all man-
ufacturing on the eastern seaboard after 1850.269 Coal continues to comprise a 
substantial portion of the U.S. energy mix, and many still view it as a cheap 
source of energy with a handful of regrettable consequences.270 Notwithstand-
ing the gains the country has reaped from the sacrifice of Appalachia, the 
widespread environmental justice issues have yet to be remedied. 
Despite the many harms the extractive industry brought to Appalachia, 
the decline of coal did its own damage. This shift also cannot be dismissed 
purely as a private phenomenon unworthy of public intervention. Many point 
to lowered costs of extracting one of coal’s main competitors, natural gas, with 
the advent of high-volume hydraulic fracturing technology.271 But the full story 
also involves increased environmental regulations, “including the Transport 
Rule, Mercury Air Toxics Standards, and the Clean Power Plan,” which have 
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also had an effect on the industry.272 Because of these and other factors, coal’s 
market share of the U.S. energy mix dropped from fifty percent in 2009 to thir-
ty-four percent in 2012.273 Professor McGinley concludes “that few in the con-
servation/environmental community, the coal and power industries, nor leaders 
of any political stripe are advocating planning and action to address the reality 
of declining coal production in central Appalachia and what it portends for 
coalfield communities.”274 
The causes of the decline of coal are the subject of much debate. For the 
most part, this debate is framed as a classic “jobs versus environment” tension, 
which tends to fall along political lines or urban-versus-rural ones. Pro-coal 
commentators insist that measures such as the Obama administration’s Clean 
Power Plan would have direct impacts on mining communities’ livelihoods.275 
Those who support a policy of reducing carbon emissions often insist that coal 
has declined and will decline for other reasons—such as automation and com-
petition from natural gas.276 
More recently, prominent environmental scholars have acknowledged that 
environmental regulations may indeed have adverse economic consequences for 
discrete populations.277 This is an important step. By insisting that market causes 
alone have killed coal—and that therefore, the socioeconomic decline and in-
creased vulnerability of coal communities is acceptable—environmentalists un-
dermine their own cause. The nation’s energy supply has always been crafted 
by policy. Direct subsidies, tax benefits, and the aforementioned lax regulatory 
regime have paved the way for fossil fuels to dominate for the past two hun-
dred years. Wind-generated energy, for example, requires major up-front in-
vestments that would likely deter investors, but for the investment incentives 
crafted by state and federal policymakers. 
The claim that coal’s decline “just happened” rings somewhat hollow 
when considered in this light. Congress’s decision to barely regulate natural 
gas was intentional.278 Coal’s decline cannot simply be attributed to “natural 
causes”; rather, government policies allowed—and at times actively contribut-
ed to—the industry’s decline. It is possible to recognize this decline as a diffi-
culty for coalfield communities while also celebrating the decline’s implica-
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tions for better carbon emissions policy. But failing to acknowledge the role of 
public decisionmakers in both creating and abandoning the coalfields leaves 
those communities “forgotten”—or better put, sacrificed once to produce ener-
gy, then sacrificed anew in the name of a clean environment for everyone.279 
The Appalachian story is often framed as unique. Although it might be a 
particularly extreme example, other rural communities have been trapped in 
similar relationships with extractive industries, growing dependent on the very 
industries harming them.280 Thus, when the industries have declined, in the 
absence of sound transitional policy—which is often lacking in the 
“boom/bust” scenarios associated with natural resource extraction—the com-
munities are left with little.281 In either case, the unsubtle harms to the envi-
ronment and the people paint a picture of a knowing collective sacrifice of the 
rural population, as do the unmitigated economic losses. 
3. Manufacturing 
Manufacturing is a third sector that has historically been one of the few 
lifelines sustaining the rural way of life. Although deindustrialization has af-
fected urban centers, rural communities have been disproportionately depend-
ent on manufacturing and are more likely to lack other opportunities when 
plants close.282 As is the case with natural resource extraction and agriculture, 
the law’s treatment of the manufacturing sector over the past several decades 
has raised both environmental justice and just transitions concerns in relation 
to rural welfare. 
Much has been written about the rash of manufacturing plant closures of 
the 1980s and 1990s.283 With the advent of the North Atlantic Free Trade 
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Agreement (NAFTA) under the Clinton administration, as well as other 
measures such as the treaty creating the World Trade Organization, many 
longstanding manufacturing plants opted to relocate to places where labor was 
cheaper and regulations were laxer.284 As this swift change spread throughout 
the country, mass layoffs displaced workers, and, in some instances, entire 
towns.285 
Yet, both then and now, the displacement issue has remained at the pe-
riphery.286 Today, little nuanced commentary seeks to understand the ongoing 
ramifications of widespread deindustrialization.287 Most sum up this phase as 
historical background, with a handful of words—globalization, deindustrializa-
tion, or outsourcing of jobs, for instance. Little modern scholarship harkens 
back to the specific measures that purported to address the large-scale dis-
placement of the many workers and communities whose livelihoods had 
evolved over time around the manufacturing sector.288 With the benefit of 
hindsight, it seems clear that the federal legal measures implemented to mini-
mize workers’ losses could hardly be called a good-faith effort.289 
One of those federal efforts was the Trade Adjustment Act of 1974 
(TAA). The TAA attempted to offset the effects of reduced trade restrictions on 
workers and communities.290 The Act provided compensation for lost wages 
and job retraining for workers who could make a showing that their losses 
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stemmed from international competition.291 The Department of Labor adminis-
ters the TAA, and continues to hear petitions from workers claiming displace-
ment today. Diverse industries are affected by international competition. But 
the vast majority of claims come from employers and workers in the manufac-
turing sector.292 Since the start of the program, several million workers have 
taken advantage of it.293 
Although preferable to inaction, the Act has been criticized as failing to 
provide adequate compensation for workers’ and communities’ losses. Econo-
mists disagree about its overall effects. Some argue that it is “reasonably effec-
tive as compensation,” though perhaps not as a means for effective retraining 
or relocation assistance.294 Critics cite studies illustrating that by transitioning 
to the program, the average worker loses approximately thirty percent of his or 
her wages. These workers are also unlikely to ever find jobs that pay as well or 
have benefits comparable to the work they lost.295 Of importance to the aging 
rural population, the program proves least effective for older workers who 
have been in their particular industry for an extended period. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a social movement arose in response to the only 
partially mitigated trend of large-scale displacement. This movement was due, 
at least in part, to TAA’s inability to account for all losses—particularly where 
entire communities were displaced.296 Activists agitated for private and public 
recognition of the economic upheaval that plant closures effectuated.297 Some 
modest judicial and legislative gains came from the plant-closure movement. 
But for the most part, deindustrialization was swift, and its fallout only mini-
mally addressed through law.298 
Among those modest successes was the 1988 Worker Adjustment, Re-
training and Notification Act (WARN Act) that was passed in response to 
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widespread plant closures with the goal of aiding dislocated workers.299 Yet, 
even from its inception, critics were skeptical that the WARN Act would mean-
ingfully address the vulnerability associated with layoffs. The Act’s language 
was vague and unclear, raising difficulties in application.300 Perhaps most 
egregiously, the WARN Act required only that employers with one hundred or 
more employees provide sixty days’ advance notice of a planned closing or 
“mass layoff” of fifty employees or more.301 
The deindustrialization trend is thus arguably the least subtle example of 
an unjust transition from traditional rural livelihoods. Although the U.S. econ-
omy enjoyed a net boom from the swift and unmitigated measures that under-
mined this rural economic lifeline, many small communities dependent on one 
major employer were essentially destroyed.302 Today’s ghost towns—
communities that have ceased to exist due to full-scale out-migration and 
abandonment—can often trace their death directly back to a plant closure. 
These losses were distributed to urban centers as well. But rural communities’ 
dependency on manufacturing, lack of alternatives, and the subsequent prolif-
eration of rural blight all suggest that rural communities bore a disproportion-
ate burden of these economic losses. And these losses were generally justified 
in the name of “progress” or the aggregate welfare. 
Like resource extraction and agribusiness, rural manufacturing brought 
environmental degradation in addition to economic losses. Rural environmen-
tal justice concerns surrounding manufacturing manifested both before and 
after deindustrialization. Although rural manufacturing pollution is under-
studied, examples such as West Virginia’s “Chemical Valley” in the Kanawha 
River Valley and Louisiana’s “Cancer Alley” in a rural, black community out-
side Baton Rouge illustrate both substantive and procedural rural environmen-
tal justice concerns arising from manufacturing.303 
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For almost one hundred years, the Kanawha River Valley hosted the na-
tion’s largest concentration of chemical plants, achieving “a degree of global 
infamy” over the years because of accidents and explosions.304 In 2014, a 
chemical spill contaminated drinking water for more than 200,000 people in 
nine counties in West Virginia for an extended period.305 But even before the 
spill, “it was not unusual to find black water running from kitchen faucets” in 
the area, “[o]r to see children with chronic skin rashes. Or bathtub enamel eat-
en away, leaving locals to wonder what the same water was doing to their 
teeth.”306 Local residents have spent decades attempting to use the law to pro-
tect themselves, but have achieved few successes. 
“Cancer Alley,” Louisiana, has had a similar story. The small town of La-
Place, Louisiana, is one of the rural communities alongside the series of plants 
on the road from New Orleans to Baton Rouge. In a town surrounded by doz-
ens of petrochemical plants, a sign posted by activists warns residents that they 
are “more likely to get cancer due to chloroprene air emissions.”307 According 
to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), residents in this community 
“face the highest risk in the country of developing cancer from air toxins.”308 
Like in the Kanawha River Valley, residents have used a variety of legal strate-
gies to fight the plants over the years, with few improvements to show for it. 
After deindustrialization, brownfields and property vacancy have perhaps 
become the more widespread rural environmental justice concerns, which af-
fect former manufacturing communities but also others that have lost popula-
tion.309 When plants left communities, they left their built infrastructure be-
hind. These leftover buildings may be contaminated, highly expensive to ad-
dress, and the most dominant feature of a rural town.310 Although the EPA’s 
brownfields program provides assistance for rural communities to remediate 
such sites, the scale of today’s rural property vacancy, abandonment, and dilap-
idation suggests that many rural communities are fending for themselves in 
dealing with this burden.311 Due to their size, more limited land use regula-
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tions, and other socioeconomic challenges, the task of remediation is naturally 
harder for rural communities.312 Where problem properties remain, they act 
both as a hazardous impediment to healthy environments and as an ongoing 
symbol of economic loss.313 
To summarize, the overall theme in the legal regimes shaping key rural 
livelihoods over the past several decades is a pattern of decisionmakers choos-
ing to trade rural welfare for some other perceived benefits. The Federal Re-
serve, the FmHA, Congress, and state legislatures opted to facilitate the rise of 
agribusiness to the detriment of the small farmer. These acts concentrated eco-
nomic losses and environmental burdens on rural communities in the name of 
cheap, abundant food. The SMCRA and natural gas regulations have been 
weak, while measures to mitigate the decline of extractive jobs have been min-
imal; the former measures were justified by cheap, reliable energy, while the 
latter inaction has been justified by environmental benefits. And plants were 
permitted to abruptly close up shop despite entire towns’ reliance on them. 
Meanwhile rural residents have been left to deal with a widespread rise in va-
cant, abandoned, or contaminated industrial and residential buildings. In each 
of these sectors, the law led to rural communities’ disproportionate share of 
economic losses and substantial environmental burdens. This analysis shows 
that it is not accurate to suggest that the rural America in decline “died” or 
“was forgotten.” The public used rural America for gain; rural America was 
sacrificed, and that sacrifice is on the public’s conscience. 
One might be tempted to argue that at least some rural residents have 
brought these scenarios on themselves. According to some, rural residents 
should now be left to reap what they have sown by “voting against their inter-
ests.”314 Put more mildly, others argue that it is condescending to second-guess 
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rural preferences as they are expressed at the voting booth. There is, perhaps, 
some truth to the idea that anti-tax, anti-government sentiment in some places 
has contributed to rural infrastructural decline or the persistence of hazardous 
industries.315 Residents fail to vote for the higher taxes that might help promote 
local safeguards, vote against land-use planning, and at times enthusiastically 
embrace these hazardous industries when they come calling.316 
But blithe dismissals of the challenges illuminated above fail to account 
for several key points. First, in each of these sectors, literature on rural social 
movements indicates that rural communities have often attempted to expel 
these hazardous industries or improve their working and living conditions, on-
ly to have those efforts crushed.317 Second, a robust body of literature demon-
strates that rural needs are often excluded from policy making.318 Points one 
and two suggest that there is more complexity to rural participation in the po-
litical process than electoral maps reveal. Limited access to information and 
other resources may facilitate some rural residents’ complicity in their own 
disenfranchisement.319 Finally, literature on structural inequality suggests that 
one ought to pause and dig deeper before blaming marginalized groups for 
their own marginalization.320  
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IV. CONTEMPLATING EQUITABLE RURAL REFORM 
Having laid a foundation to characterize rural distributive injustice, this 
Part briefly addresses the “what should be done about it” question, leaving fur-
ther explication for future projects. It suggests that achieving distributive jus-
tice for rural America requires either: (1) addressing inequity across the 
board—rural and non-rural—through a more just distribution of resources for 
everyone, or (2) pursuing remedial considerations specific to rural communi-
ties.321 
Addressing inequity generally is perhaps the more straightforward way to 
address rural distributive injustice. Other communities delineated along non-
geographic lines, such as race, have experienced comparable or worse inequi-
ties, as have marginalized urban communities. To prioritize rural communities 
in zero-sum allocations of resources would raise its own questions of justice. 
Yet, helping everyone would help rural communities. The loss of rural 
livelihoods would not be felt so acutely if unemployment did not make people 
so vulnerable to housing insecurity, health problems, and bankruptcy. Similar-
ly, the loss of rural jobs and the destruction of the rural environment would not 
be so problematic if people had the means to relocate or afford medical care. 
Far-reaching legislation such as the proposed “Green New Deal” would help 
rectify inequities stemming from limited access to decent work and a decent 
environment. 
                                                                                                                           
 321 Although not contemplated in depth here, increasing access to mobility is another avenue 
worth exploring for potentially mitigating rural vulnerability. For an exchange on impediments to 
mobility “in regions where it is needed most,” see generally Sheila R. Foster, The Limits of Mobility 
and the Persistence of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE L.J. F. 480 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.
org/pdf/Foster_styrqpy4.pdf [https://perma.cc/E666-NEU6] (discussing urban inequality and ra-
cial/economic stratification as impediments to mobility); Sara Pratt, Civil Rights Strategies to Increase 
Mobility, 127 YALE L.J. F. 498 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Pratt_wkyqnv49.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9ADS-RX9X] (discussing civil rights-based impediments to mobility); Schleicher, 
supra note 2 (discussing responses to the impediments); David Schleicher, Surreply: How and Why 
We Should Become Un-Stuck!, 127 YALE L.J. F. 571 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org
/pdf/Schleicher_24qnzowt.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9TA-XBUM] (acknowledging racial discrimination 
and segregation as impediments to mobility while arguing against the “false hope” that policy can 
revive declining areas); Naomi Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of 
Place, 127 YALE L.J. F. 458 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Schoenbaum_dyqnw2cu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36SZ-QRZ4]; Alec MacGillis, The Coal Industry Is Dying, and It’s Leaving Com-
munities Like This One to Pick Up the Pieces, MOTHER JONES (May 28, 2018), https://www.mother
jones.com/environment/2018/05/the-coal-industry-is-dying-and-its-leaving-communities-like-this-one-
to-pick-up-the-pieces/ [https://perma.cc/FZ8G-USDS] (highlighting how fewer Americans moved in 
2017 than in any year dating back to the 1950s, and offering New York Times columnist David 
Brook’s explanation as to the reason why: people no longer have confidence in the economy). Another 
topic for further discussion is Revesz’s more general idea that distributional concerns should factor 
more heavily into government regulation. Revesz, supra note 17, at 1555. 
2020] Distributive Justice and Rural America 249 
The Green New Deal, although not fully defined as of this writing, would 
pursue a massive jobs program geared toward creating economic opportunity 
while also weaning the country from fossil fuels.322 Alternative measures to 
address inequity, such as universal basic income, a federal guarantee of em-
ployment, single-payer healthcare, and free, high-quality education would also 
help to rectify the concerns outlined in this Article. One might be tempted to 
dismiss this option as politically or economically unrealistic. But similar initia-
tives have been pursued in the past, and ongoing consideration of legislation 
like the Green New Deal suggests that these proposals are not outlandish.323 
A universalist approach to distributive justice is the preferable one. Econo-
mists, agricultural experts, and others grappling with the issue of rural revitaliza-
tion are often flummoxed by tailored approaches. Federal transitional policies 
geared toward addressing rural displacement have not been particularly success-
ful.324 The vastness of the crumbling rural infrastructure is overwhelming.325 
Dead industries are unlikely to be revived, and nor should they be in most cases. 
Tinkering to find the perfect revitalization policy or public-private part-
nership faces a profound uphill battle to fix large-scale rural decline and 
longstanding under-investment.326 Some success stories exist. But quick fix-
es—such as “teaching coal miners to code,” “investing in microbreweries,” or 
“having them grow hemp”—discount the complexity of this issue while also 
disregarding the preferences and capabilities of locals.327 Perhaps it should be 
recognized that the private sector simply is not the solution here, and for good 
reason. The law has empowered the private sector so robustly, and it has 
wronged rural communities so dramatically, pursuing corporate incentives or 
benevolence to “save” rural America would merely be sending rural communi-
ties back into the lion’s den. 
Of course, some might observe that many rural residents would not vote 
for these measures or the politicians that support them. These skeptics might 
also point to the fact that rural residents have disproportionate voting power, 
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suggesting that they are not in need of advocacy.328 This tension is admittedly 
complex; it is presumed that disproportionate rural representation in legisla-
tures is problematic. Although this question is outside the scope of this paper, 
as noted above, this stance discounts rural minorities who do not vote for con-
servatives. Further, this disproportionate power does not square with rural 
communities’ disproportionately low per capita resources, higher rates of per-
sistent poverty, and limited access to basic services, such as broadband, 
schools, doctors, and lawyers.329 It is true that many rural residents would dis-
agree with the recommendations presented in this Article and make those sen-
timents known at the voting booth. But it is not true that someone who opposes 
subsidized healthcare deserves to go bankrupt because of medical expenses, or 
that someone who supports coal mining deserves to die from black lung. This 
Article does not ask what some rural residents would vote for; rather, it asks 
what is just. 
As an alternative or complement to a universalist approach, remedies tai-
lored to rural conditions may also make a difference. Yet, even a more tailored 
approach would require redirecting more resources toward rural communities 
to address their basic needs. Rural residents are literally and urgently unsafe in 
light of closures of hospitals and police departments stemming from drops in 
local tax coffers; states should intervene to provide these needed services.330 At 
a somewhat less immediate level, communities in decline can be helped to de-
cline with dignity. Communities that stand to be revitalized may benefit from 
resources strategically geared toward economic diversification. Both types of 
communities would benefit from efforts to address the country’s aging infra-
structure, for which federal precedent does exist.331 Limits on corporate power 
to use land and people with impunity would also help empower rural workers 
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and communities to better protect themselves and ensure a more just distribu-
tion of burdens and benefits.332 
In either case, though, it must be understood that rural communities can-
not, ethically and practically, be left to rectify their plight alone. The distribu-
tive justice critique presented above demonstrates that this problem is a collec-
tive one. Public decisionmakers have failed to address persistent rural poverty. 
Their actions have sacrificed rural communities that are declining in the name 
of aggregate benefits. It is thus now these decisionmakers’ task to rectify rural 
distributive injustice. Even if one is skeptical of the moral case for rural salva-
tion, the practical one still reigns because urban communities depend so heavi-
ly on rural productive activities, and because of the threats to stability that un-
just transitions have wielded. Thus, no matter what the precise path toward the 
outcome may be, this Article necessarily implies that a fairer proportion of re-
sources and protections must be directed toward rural communities. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article attempts to answer the questions, “What happened to rural 
America and what should be done about it?” because current public and schol-
arly discussions are failing to. Common answers are that “rural America died” 
and “it is unclear that anything can be done.” These answers are inadequate. 
Allowing chronic rural poverty to continue is a political choice. For communi-
ties in decline, they did not “die”; decades of knowing law and policy deci-
sions made rural people and places worse off in the name of collective bene-
fits, including cheap energy, clean energy, cheap and abundant food, cheap 
goods, and a higher GDP. These decisions effectuated distributive injustice 
through political institutions, concentrating burdens on a sacrificial population 
in the name of collective gain. This distributive injustice became layered atop 
the more glaring substantive distributive injustice that also shapes rural com-
munities, including the law’s inequitable allocations of resources and persistent 
poverty that fall harder on the shoulders of rural communities of color. 
These problems are not unsolvable, however. A more equitable allocation 
of resources and protections to all marginalized populations would go far to 
rectifying rural inequity. So, too, would tailored approaches that do more to 
address the distinct forces that created today’s rural conditions. In any case, 
whether it is for reasons of human compassion, public complicity, or a prag-
matic concern for food and energy provision, rural challenges are not just a 
“rural problem”—they are everyone’s problem. 
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